A new notion of equilibrium, which we call strong equilibrium, is introduced for timeinconsistent stopping problems in continuous time. Compared to the existing notions introduced in Time-Consistent Stopping Under Decreasing Impatience and On Finding Equilibrium Stopping Times for...

Despite the economic relevance of strong political and property rights, we still lack an organic and empirically sound theory of their origins and interaction. In our model, the elite can elicit the nonelite's cooperation in investment by enacting a more inclusive political process, which allows...

In this paper we propose a unified utility deviation-risk model which covers both utility maximization and mean-variance analysis as special cases. We derive the time-consistent Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for the equilibrium value function and significantly reduce the number of state...

We introduce the concept of forward rank-dependent performance criteria, extending the original notion to forward criteria that incorporate probability distortions. A fundamental challenge is how to reconcile the time-consistent nature of forward performance criteria with the time-inconsistency...

In this paper, we study intertemporal social welfare evaluations when agents' discount factors may be different. We first show that there exists a conflict between efficiency, equity, and time consistency, even if all agents share the same discount factor. We argue that this impossibility result...

In a continuous-time setting, the existing notion of equilibrium strategies for time-inconsistent problems in the literature, referred to as weak equilibrium, is not fully aligned with the standard definition of equilibrium in the game theory in that the agent may be willing to deviate from a...

Financial covenants influence firm behavior by state-contingently allocating decision rights. I develop a quantitative model with long-term debt where shareholders cannot commit to not dilute existing lenders with new debt issuances and risky investments. Lenders intervene upon covenant...

We study contracts between naive present-biased consumers and risk-neutral firms. We show that the welfare loss from present bias vanishes as the contracting horizon grows. This is true both when bargaining power is on the consumers' and on the firms' side, when consumers cannot commit to...

This paper studies the welfare of time-inconsistent, partially sophisticated agents living under two different regimes, one with complete, unfettered credit markets (CM) and the other with endogenous borrowing constraints (EBC) where the borrowing limits are set to make agents indifferent...