Time-inconsistency may play a central role in explaining inter-temporal behavior, particularly among poor households. However, little is known about the distribution of time-inconsistent agents, and time-preference parameters are typically not identified in standard dynamic choice models. We...

In the real world, public pay-as-you-go pension (PAYG) schemes are popular and co-exist with private, retirement-saving schemes. This is true even in dynamically efficient economies where such pensions offer a lower return. The classic Aaron-Samuelson result argues that, in theory, this is...

We study time-consistent debt policies in a trade-off model of debt in which the firm can freely issue new debt and repurchase existing debt. A debt policy is time-consistent if in any state equityholders prefer to follow it rather than to deviate from it but lose credibility in sustaining debt...

Collateral constraints widely used in models of financial crises feature a pecuniary externality: Agents do not internalize how borrowing decisions taken in "good times" affect collateral prices during a crisis. We show that agents in a competitive equilibrium borrow more than a financial...

When we implement a portfolio selection methodology under a mean-risk formulation, it is essential to correctly model investors' risk aversion which may be time-dependent, or even state-dependent during the investment procedure. In this paper, we propose a behavior risk aversion model, which is...

For time inconsistent multi-period mean-variance portfolio decision, we develop a two-tier planner-doer game model with self-control, in which planner and doers represent different interests of the same investor at different time instants and planner (the willpower to resist short term...

The discrete-time mean-variance portfolio selection formulation, a representative of general dynamic mean-risk portfolio selection problems, does not satisfy time consistency in efficiency (TCIE) in general, i.e., a truncated pre-committed efficient policy may become inefficient when considering...

We develop a model in which, in order to provide managerial incentives, it is optimal to have costly bankruptcy. If benevolent governments can commit to their policies, it is optimal not to interfere with private contracts. Such policies are time inconsistent in the sense that, without...