Manufacturers and distributors in marketing channels commonly establish prices, margins, and other trade terms through negotiations. These negotiations have significant impact on channel members' profit streams over the duration of the business relationship. We consider a situation where a...

Academic work on sales compensation plans features agency models prominently, and these models have also been used to build decision aids for managers. However, empirical support remains sketchy. We conducted three experiments to investigate three unresolved predictions involving the...

In collaborating to compete, firms forge different types of strategic alliances: same-function alliances, parallel development of new products, and cross-functional alliances. A major challenge in the management of these alliances is how to control the resource commitment of partners to the...

Published as:"The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems," Rationality and Society 2(3), July 1990, 335-358."A large, multidisciplinary literature focuses on the problems occurring when multiple individuals concurrently use common-pool resources such as fisheries, grazing areas, airsheds, oil...

"In this paper we formulate a cost-induced equilibrium concept. This equilibrium is generated from transaction costs connected with a sequential agenda process. Our claim is that most collective choice Institutions carry with them decision costs. If these transaction costs are very large, they...

It is well known that, in general, there are a multitude of supergame equilibria in noncooperative duopoly markets, suggesting the inability (without severe restrictions) of theory alone to determine the 'best' strategy in a repeated game context. Axelrod's prisoner's dilemma simulation...

This paper reports results of an experiment design ed to investigate the nature of cooperation and punishment. Subjects are matched in a series of two-person, two-stage games with a sequential equilibrium that supports first-stage cooperation with a credible threat of subsequent punishment....

In this paper, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In their duopoly game, firms can choose their quantities in one of two periods before the market clears. If a firm commits to a quantity in period 1 it does not know whether the...

Is the rapid growth of experimental research in economics evidence of a new scientific spirit at work or merely fresh evidence of a misplaced desire to ape the methods of natural sciences? It is often argued that economic experiments are artificial in some sense that tends to render the results...