We explore the constrained efficient observational learning model - as when individuals care about successors, or are so induced by an informationlly-constrained social planner. We find that when the herding externality is correctly internalized in this fashion, incorrect herds still obtain. To...

Cet article compare une stratégie de baisse des rendements avec celle de la jachère tournante pour atteindre une même réduction quantitative des productions céréalières et d'oléo-protéagineux. La concavité nettement plus prononcée des fonctions de production réelles à l'égard de la...

Supposer que la diversite des choix correspond a des erreurs par rapport a un modele entraine des termes d'erreurs econometriques trop importants. Nous supposons au contraire que les individus ont des fonction encodees par des parametres individuels. A l'issue d'une simulation stochastique, les...

This paper describes an approach to assessing the technical performance of a candidate system by means of comparison to a reference system of known performance characteristics.

We analyse an economy where production is subject to moral hazard.

We analyse an economy where production is subject to moral hazard. The degree of the incentive (agency) costs introduced by the presence of moral hazard naturally depends on the information structure in the economy; it is cheaper to induce correct incentives in a society which possesses better...

We analyze the dynamics of the (non-drastic) patents which last for several periods when its owner is asymmetrically informed in relation to their users. These learn -by using the patent- its cost characteristics, and there is symmetric information among the users. In this setting, we show that...

The aim of this paper is to study the (non-drastic) patent dynamics when their users have private information with respect to the patent owner and the rival users. We found that, together with the sampling effect and the dissipation effect, an informational effect appears and, as a consequence,...