We study a game in which two firms compete in quality to serve a market consisting of consumers with different initial consideration sets. If both firms invest below a certain threshold, they only compete for those consumers already aware of their existence. Above this threshold, a firm is...

We study a game in which two firms compete in quality to serve a market consisting of consumers with different initial consideration sets. If both firms invest below a certain threshold, they only compete for those consumers already aware of their existence. Above this threshold, a firm is...

We study a game in which two firms compete in quality to serve a market consisting of consumers with different initial consideration sets. If both firms invest below a certain threshold, they only compete for those consumers already aware of their existence. Above this threshold, a firm is...

This paper examines simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a twoplayer contest with a general contest success function. The timing of moves, determined in a pre‐play stage prior to the contest‐subgame, as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous. Contrary to...

This paper examines simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a two player contest with a general contest success function. The timing of moves, determined in a pre-play stage prior to the contest-subgame, as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous. Contrary to...

This paper examines simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a twoplayer contest with a general contest success function. The timing of moves, determined in a pre‐play stage prior to the contest‐subgame, as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous. Contrary to...