We study the estimation of static games where players are allowed to have ordered actions, such as the number of stores to enter into a market. Assuming that pay- off functions satisfy general shape restrictions, we show that equilibrium of the game implies a covariance restriction between each...

We study the estimation of static games where players are allowed to have ordered actions, such as the number of stores to enter into a market. Assuming that pay- off functions satisfy general shape restrictions, we show that equilibrium of the game implies a covariance restriction between each...

One recent development in the organizational economics approach to strategy management concerns the integration of the organizational capabilities view and the transaction costs theory. My dissertation takes on this task focusing on transaction costs economics, dynamic capabilities, and temporal...

This paper offers an explanation for the common observation that political incumbents not only frequently win reelection, but often face weak competition or no competition at all when running for reelection. I explain this outcome by modeling the entry decision of potential election candidates...

This paper offers an explanation for the common observation that political incumbents not only frequently win reelection, but often face weak competition or no competition at all when running for reelection. I explain this outcome by modeling the entry decision of potential election candidates...