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  • Search: subject:"Equal Discount Factor"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Equal Discount Factor 7 Long-run Players 7 Repeated Games 7 Reputation 7 Complicated Types 3 Finite Automaton 3 War of Attrition 2 Imperfect Monitoring 1 Imperfect Observation 1 imperfect Observation 1
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Online availability
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Free 7
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 7
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 3
Language
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Undetermined 4 English 3
Author
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Ekmekci, Mehmet 7 Atakan, Alp 3 Atakan, Alp E. 3 Atakan, Alp Enver 1
Institution
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Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management 3 Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 1
Published in...
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Discussion Paper 3 Discussion Papers / Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management 3 MPRA Paper 1
Source
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RePEc 4 EconStor 3
Showing 1 - 7 of 7
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Reputation in Repeated Moral Hazard Games
Atakan, Alp Enver; Ekmekci, Mehmet - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
We study an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous-move stage game. Player one monitors the stage- game actions of player two imperfectly, while player two monitors the pure stage- game actions of player one perfectly. Player one’s type is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113383
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Reputation with long run players and imperfect observation
Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekci, Mehmet - 2009
Previous work shows that reputation results may fail in repeated games between two long-run players with equal discount factors. We restrict attention to an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous move stage game where actions of player 2 are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282883
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Reputation with long run players and imperfect
Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekci, Mehmet - 2009
We model a long-run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents. In each period, the agents play an extensive-form game of perfect information. There is incomplete information about the type of player 1 while player 2's type is commonly known. We show that a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282903
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A two-sided reputation result with long run
Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekci, Mehmet - 2009
Cripps et al. (2005) conjectured that in an infinitely repeated game with two equally patient players, if there is positive probability that the players could be Stackelberg types, then equilibrium behavior would resemble a war of attrition, i.e., a two-sided reputation result would hold. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282930
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Reputation in the Long-Run with Imperfect Monitoring
Atakan, Alp; Ekmekci, Mehmet - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2009
We study an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous-move stage game. Player one monitors the stagegame actions of player two imperfectly, while player two monitors the pure stagegame actions of player one perfectly. Player one’s type is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804918
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Reputation in Long-Run Relationships
Atakan, Alp; Ekmekci, Mehmet - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2009
We model a long-run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents. In each period, the agents play an extensive-form game of perfect information. There is incomplete information about the type of player 1 while player 2’s type is commonly known. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804920
Saved in:
Cover Image
A two Sided Reputation Result with Long Run Players
Ekmekci, Mehmet; Atakan, Alp - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2009
Cripps et al. (2005) conjectured that in an infinitely repeated game with two equally patient players, if there is positive probability that the players could be Stackelberg types, then equilibrium behavior would resemble a war of attrition, i.e., a two-sided reputation result would hold. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804921
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