Search Results - subject:"Equilibrium Selection"

The complementarity between trust and contract enforcement

Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Huffman, David; Netzer, Nick - 2024

comes from experiments that exogenously vary both trust and contract enforcement. We argue that the mechanism is equilibrium … selection: richer opportunities for contract enforcement can lead to a wider set of equilibria. Trust can then become more …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015117809

Coordination in stag hunt games

Silva, Rui - In: Journal of behavioral and experimental economics 113 (2024), pp. 1-9

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015163459

Equilibrium selection in hawk-dove games

Blazquez de Paz, Mario; Koptyug, Nikita - In: Games 15 (2024) 1, pp. 1-30

We apply three equilibrium selection techniques to study which equilibrium is selected in a hawk-dove game with a … auctioneer in the equilibrium selection. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014480782

Financial crises as a phenomenon of multiple equilibria and how to select among them

Mäder, Nicolas - In: Journal of money, credit and banking : JMCB 56 (2024) 2/3, pp. 517-536

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014544966

Group size as selection device

De Sinopoli, Francesco; Ferraris, Leo; Meroni, Claudia - 2024

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537459

The complementarity between trust and contract enforcement

Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Huffman, David; Netzer, Nick - 2024 - Revised version, October 2024

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015114774

An Experimental Test of the Global-Game Selection in Coordination Games with Asymmetric Players

Heinemann, Frank - 2023

In symmetric binary-choice coordination games, the global-game selection (GGS) has been proven to predict a high proportion of observed choices correctly. In these games, the GGS is identical to the best response to Laplacian beliefs about the fraction of players choosing either action. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467731