I analyze the market for credit ratings with competition between more than two rating agencies. How can honest rating behavior be achieved, and under which conditions can a new honest rating agency successfully invade a market with inflating incumbents? My model predicts cyclic dynamics if...

Entrepreneurial agglomerations often feature positive feedback mechanisms such as strategic complementarities, knowledge spillovers and network externalities. However, they can also occur in the absence of these mechanisms, even across regions of considerably homogeneous economic potential. We...

We address the cooperation problem in structured populations by considering the prisoner’s dilemma game as a metaphor of the social interactions between individuals with imitation capacity. We present a new strategy update rule called democratic weighted update where the individual’s...

We focus on the tax evasion dynamics emerging from repeated interaction of three types of taxpayers: cheaters, honest citizens and punishers. By assuming that cultural evolution is driven by material payoffs only, we show that a long overlooked behavioral attitude towards taxation such as tax...

Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to promote cooperation in social institutions. The evolution of cooperation under reward and punishment incentives in joint enterprises has been formalized and investigated, mostly by using compulsory public good games. Recently,...