Search Results - subject:"Evolutionary Game Theory"

Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game

Noailly, Joëlle; Bergh, Jeroen C. J. M. van den; … - 2005

Conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game are studied. This combines in a unique way local and global interactions. A fixed number of harvesters are located on a spatial grid. Harvesters choose among three strategies: defection, cooperation, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064334

Evolutionary game theory: an exposition

Lahkar, Ratul - In: Indian Growth and Development Review 5 (2012) 2, pp. 203-213

Purpose – This article aims to provide an exposition of evolutionary game theory which can be used for pedagogical … underpinnings of evolutionary game theory. The paper aims to illustrate the theory using some simple examples. Findings – The paper … an educational briefing for students and researchers who are new to the field of evolutionary game theory. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014758964

Individual autonomy in evolutionary game theory: defending Sugden against Ross’s accusation of eliminativism

Stimolo, Marco - In: International Review of Economics 59 (2012) 1, pp. 67-80

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010846026

Large Population Limits for Evolutionary Dynamics with Random Matching

Molzon, Robert - In: Dynamic Games and Applications 2 (2012) 1, pp. 146-159

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010849062

EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF HUE, A HUE STRUCTURE, AND COLOR CATEGORIZATION IN NOVICE AND STABLE LEARNERS

STEINGRIMSSON, RAGNAR - In: Advances in Complex Systems (ACS) 15 (2012) 03, pp. 1150018-1

Evolutionary game theory is used to form a finite partition of a continuous hue circle in which perceptually similar …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011010861

Delayed and Inconsistent Information and the Evolution of Trust

Manapat, Michael; Rand, David - In: Dynamic Games and Applications 2 (2012) 4, pp. 401-410

Trust is essential in virtually all economic interactions. In this paper, we build on previous work analyzing the “trust game” from the perspective of evolutionary dynamics. There are two players: an “investor” and a “trustee.” The investor begins with one monetary unit and can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011001876

Spatio-temporal dynamics of security investments in an interdependent risk environment

Shafi, Kamran; Bender, Axel; Zhong, Weicai; Abbass, … - In: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 391 (2012) 20, pp. 5004-5017

In a globalised world where risks spread through contagion, the decision of an entity to invest in securing its premises from stochastic risks no longer depends solely on its own actions but also on the actions of other interacting entities in the system. This phenomenon is commonly seen in many...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010590726

Stochastic imitative game dynamics with committed agents

Sandholm, William H. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 5, pp. 2056-2071

We consider models of stochastic evolution in two-strategy games in which agents employ imitative decision rules. We introduce committed agents: for each strategy, we suppose that there is at least one agent who plays that strategy without fail. We show that unlike the standard imitative model,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594317

The Evolution of Coercive Institutional Punishment

Isakov, Alexander; Rand, David - In: Dynamic Games and Applications 2 (2012) 1, pp. 97-109

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010539576

LANGUAGE, CATEGORIZATION, AND CONVENTION

NARENS, LOUIS; JAMESON, KIMBERLY A.; KOMAROVA, NATALIA L.; … - In: Advances in Complex Systems (ACS) 15 (2012) 03, pp. 1150022-1

populations of simulated "agents". The method uses concepts from evolutionary game theory: A language game where agents assign …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010550848