Search Results - subject:"Evolutionary Game Theory"

Brennan, G.; Güth, W.; Kliemt, H. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1997

If contract enforcers must be randomly selected from the same population and thus are as opportunistic as ordinary traders could a system of adjudication nevertheless increase the degree to which contractual obligations on large anonymous markets are fulfilled? Adopting an indirect evolutionary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091713

Trust in the shadow of the courts if judges are no better

Brennan, Geoffrey; Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 1997

Can a court system conceivably control opportunistic behavior if judges are selected from the same population as ordinary citizens and thus are no better than the rest of us? This paper provides a new and, as we claim, quite profound rational choice answer to that unsolved riddle. Adopting an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983846

Evolution and Equilibria Selection of Repeated Lattice Games

An, Mark Yuying; Kiefer, Nicholas M. - 1997

In this paper we study the configuration dynamics and the societal equilibrium selection of repeated lattice games. Each player plays games only with his immediate neighbors hence indirectly interacts with everyone else. A player may or may not have perfect control over his action. Different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014178100

Loss of commitment? : an evolutionary analysis of Bagwell's example

Oechssler, Joerg; Schlag, Karl H. - 1997

In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009657122

Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game

Ponti, Giovanni - Department of Economics, University College London (UCL) - 1996

Traditional game theoretic analysis often proposes the application of backward induction and subgame-perfection as models of rational behaviour in games with perfect information. However, there are many situations in which such application leads to counterinitiative results, casting doubts on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005404133

Simultaneous Evolution of Learning Rules and Strategies

Kirchkamp, Oliver - University of Bonn, Germany - 1996

We study a model of local evolution. Players are located on a network and play games agains their neighbors. Players are characterized by three properties: (1) The stage game strategies they use agains their neighbors. (2) The repeated game strategy that determines the former. (3) A learning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968201

Bertrand Price Competition in a Social Environment

Tieman, Xander F.; Laan, Gerard van der; Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Instituut - 1996

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in De Economist (2001). Volume 149, p. 33-51. In this paper the behavior of producers in a social environment is considered from a more sociological point of view than is usually done in economics. The producers play Bertrand price competition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257473

Bertrand Price Competition in a Social Environment

Tieman, Xander F.; Laan, Gerard van der; Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Institute - 1996

In this paper the behavior of producers in a social environment is considered from a more sociological point of view than is usually done in economics. The producers play Bertrand price competition against each other and change the action they played based upon the outcome of the game, according...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005281940

Bertrand Price Competition in a Social Environment

Tieman, Xander F.; van der Laan, Gerard; Houba, Harold - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324441

Evolutionary game theory and the modelling of economic behavior

Laan, Gerard van der; Tieman, Alexander F. - 1996

economists also show a growing interest in the application of evolutionary game theory. This paper discusses the main concepts of … evolutionary game theory and their applicability to economic issues. Whereas traditional game theory focusses on the static Nash … equilibria as the possible outcomes of the game, evolutionary game theory teaches us to model explictly the behavior of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010232144