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  • Search: subject:"Ex Post Incentive Compatibility"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Mechanism design 15 ex post incentive compatibility 15 Anreiz 12 Auction theory 12 Auktionstheorie 12 Incentives 12 interdependent values 11 Auctions 9 Ex post incentive compatibility 9 Game theory 9 Spieltheorie 9 Asymmetric information 8 Asymmetrische Information 8 Mechanismus-Design-Theorie 8 ex-post incentive compatibility 6 Ex-post incentive compatibility 5 Agency theory 4 Economics of information 4 Ex Post Incentive Compatibility 4 Informationsökonomik 4 Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie 4 asymptotic efficiency 4 incentive compatibility 4 mechanism design 4 multi-unit demand and supply 4 private information 4 rationalizability 4 repeated games 4 robust implementation 4 virtual implementation 4 Allocation 3 Allokation 3 Double auction 3 Ex-post individual rationality 3 Incentive Compatibility 3 Interdependent Values 3 Mechanism Design 3 Mechanisms 3 Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem 3 Neue politische Ökonomie 3
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Online availability
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Free 23 Undetermined 10
Type of publication
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Article 27 Book / Working Paper 13
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Article in journal 15 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 15 Article 5 Working Paper 4 Arbeitspapier 3 Graue Literatur 3 Non-commercial literature 3 Aufsatz im Buch 1 Book section 1
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Language
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English 33 Undetermined 7
Author
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Postlewaite, Andrew 8 Bergemann, Dirk 6 Morris, Stephen 6 Kojima, Fuhito 4 Miller, David A. 4 Yamashita, Takuro 4 Athey, Susan 3 Barberà, Salvador 3 Berga Colom, Dolors 3 Bikhchandani, Sushil 3 Kunimoto, Takashi 3 MacLean, Richard P. 3 McLean, Richard P. 3 Moreno, Bernardo 3 McLean, Richard 2 Nath, Swaprava 2 Serrano, Roberto 2 Zoeter, Onno 2 Bloch, Francis 1 Dirk Bergemann 1 Dutta, Bhaskar 1 Dziubiński, Marcin 1 Fujinaka, Yuji 1 Han, Seungjin 1 Hashimoto, Tadashi 1 Leo, Greg 1 Miyakawa, Toshiji 1 Pourpouneh, Mohsen 1 Ramezanian, Rasoul 1 Sen, Arunava 1 Serrano, Robert 1 Stephen Morris 1
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Institution
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Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 3 Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania 3 Brown University, Department of Economics 1 Department of Economics, Princeton University 1 Department of Economics, Yale University 1 EconWPA 1 Instituto de Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) 1
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Published in...
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Theoretical Economics 9 Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory 5 Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 3 Games and economic behavior 3 PIER Working Paper Archive 3 Journal of economic theory 2 Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society 2 Barcelona GSE working paper series : working paper 1 Department of Economics working paper series / McMaster University, Department of Economics 1 Economics Letters 1 Economics letters 1 Game Theory and Information 1 International game theory review 1 Journal of mathematical economics 1 Social design : essays in memory of Leonid Hurwicz 1 Working Paper 1 Working Papers / Brown University, Department of Economics 1 Working Papers / Instituto de Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) 1 Working papers / TSE : WP 1
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Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 19 RePEc 14 EconStor 6 BASE 1
Showing 11 - 20 of 40
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Implementation with interdependent valuations
MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673132
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Domains admitting ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms : a characterization for the two-alternative case
Barberà, Salvador; Berga Colom, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - In: Social design : essays in memory of Leonid Hurwicz, (pp. 295-306). 2019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061506
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Implementation with interdependent valuations
Postlewaite, Andrew; McLean, Richard - In: Theoretical Economics (2014)
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010940430
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The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
Hashimoto, Tadashi - In: Journal of economic theory 177 (2018), pp. 708-733
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012025743
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Double auction with interdependent values : incentives and efficiency
Kojima, Fuhito; Yamashita, Takuro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 12 (2017) 3, pp. 1393-1438
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753070
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A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Games and economic behavior 101 (2017), pp. 34-48
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011788429
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Taking turns
Leo, Greg - In: Games and economic behavior 102 (2017), pp. 525-547
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011792213
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Evaluating the conditions for robust mechanism design
Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Robert - 2010
three conditions: ex post incentive compatibility, robust monotonicity, and robust measurability. Ex post incentive … that while violations of ex post incentive compatibility and robust monotonicity do not easily go away, we identify a mild … compatibility has been shown to be necessary for any concept of robust implementation, while robust monotonicity and robust …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284054
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Evaluating the Conditions for Robust Mechanism Design Abstract: We assess the strength of the different conditions identified in the literature of robust mechanism design. We focus...
Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Roberto - Brown University, Department of Economics - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509886
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Robust virtual implementation
Dirk Bergemann; Stephen Morris - Department of Economics, Yale University; Department of … - 2009
same allocation. We show that ex post incentive compatibility and robust measurability are necessary and sufficient for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009455252
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