Search Results - subject:"Ex Post Incentive Compatibility"

Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations

Athey, Susan; Miller, David A. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 2 (2007) 3, pp. 299-354

We analyze the extent to which efficient trade is possible in an ongoing relationship between impatient agents with hidden valuations (i.i.d. over time), restricting attention to equilibria that satisfy ex post incentive constraints in each period. With ex ante budget balance, efficient trade...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702316

Ex post implementation in environments with private goods

Bikhchandani, Sushil - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 369-393

We prove by construction that ex post incentive compatible mechanisms exist in a private goods setting with multi-dimensional signals and interdependent values. The mechanism shares features with the generalized Vickrey auction of one-dimensional signal models. The construction implies that for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599375

Ex post implementation in environments with private goods

Bikhchandani, Sushil - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 369-393

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515724

Ex post implementation in environments with private goods

Bikhchandani, Sushil - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 3, pp. 369-393

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702816

A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations

Nath, Swaprava; Zoeter, Onno - In: Economics Letters 121 (2013) 2, pp. 321-325

The impossibility result by Jehiel and Moldovanu says that in a setting with interdependent valuations, any efficient and ex-post incentive compatible mechanism must be a constant mechanism. Mezzetti circumvents this problem by designing a two stage mechanism where the decision of allocation and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010709080

A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations

Nath, Swaprava; Zoeter, Onno - In: Economics letters 121 (2013) 2, pp. 321-325

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010347103

Evaluating the conditions for robust mechanism design

Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Roberto - Instituto de Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Madrileño de … - 2010

three conditions: ex post incentive compatibility, robust monotonicity, and robust measurability. Ex post incentive … that while violations of ex post incentive compatibility and robust monotonicity do not easily go away, we identify a mild … compatibility has been shown to be necessary for any concept of robust implementation, while robust monotonicity and robust …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008529153

Implementation with Interdependent Valuations

McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2006

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent’s type affects other agents’ utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150196

The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information

Miller, David A. - EconWPA - 2005

In a repeated game with private information, a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) can break down if communication is not necessarily simultaneous or if players can “spy” on each others’ information. An ex post perfect public equilibrium (EPPPE) is a PPE that is ex post incentive compatible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407608

Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Second Version

McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604557