This article is devoted to the problem of the detection of overt or tacit collusion equilibrium in the context of the choice of the appropriate econometric method, a choice that is determined by the amount of information that the observer possesses. The author addresses this problem in two...

This article is devoted to the problem of the detection of overt or tacit collusion equilibrium in the context of the choice of the appropriate econometric method, a choice that is determined by the amount of information that the observer possesses. The author addresses this problem in two...

In the present paper an attempt was made to verify the possibilities of the use of a marker of structural changes of market price variance in the detection of trade collusion between business players. We used the theoretical model of strategic behaviour of trade players with the assumption of...

The article presents the notion of detection of overt or tacit collusion equilibrium in the context of choice of the appropriate econometric method, which is determined by the amount of information that the observer possesses. There has been shown one of the collusion markers coherent with an...

In this paper a supergame model of collusion based on fixed cartel quota exogenously provided by cartel members’ agreement is developed. The model provides theoretical motivation of price wars and variance screen of collusion. We use the model to explain behavior of well known Lysine...

In this paper we verify usefulness of a variance marker of collusion in an application to Lysine prices during well known cartel/competition episode. As an econometric method of detection of structural change in price volatility during collusive and competitive phase wavelet analysis was...