EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • A-Z
  • Beta
  • About EconBiz
  • News
  • Thesaurus (STW)
  • Academic Skills
  • Help
  •  My account 
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • Login
EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
Publications Events
Search options
Advanced Search history
My EconBiz
Favorites Loans Reservations Fines
    You are here:
  • Home
  • Search: subject:"Explicit learning"
Narrow search

Narrow search

Year of publication
Subject
All
Automatic processes 1 Controlled processes 1 Explicit learning 1 Greenberg works in an extensive-form context 1 Implicit learning 1 Judgment 1 Kreps and Levine (1987) 1 Multiple cue probability learning 1 Rubinstein and Wolinksy consider strategic-form games and general "signal fictions". We should make clear from the outset that 1 a key issue is what sort of prior itiormation about payoffs should be considered. It is well known that predictions based on common certainty of payoffs are not robust to even a small amount of uncertainty. Following Fudenberg 1 although this paper is motivated by the learning-theoretic approach to equilibrium in games 1 and players observe only the outcomes in their own matches 1 and that this difference corresponds to the distinction between SCE and RSCE.8 Papers by Rubinstein and Wolinksy [1994] and Greenberg [1994] 1 are based on the idea that players form their forecasts of opponents play using prior information both about the opponents' payoffs and about the realized outcomes when the game is played. Both these papers 1 as it is not in most experiments 1 both in the real world and in the laboratory 1 but it is consistent with an (approximate 1 but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. Intuitively 1 but we have not checked the details 1 by the last few rounds of the experiment the first movers had stopped contributing 1 consider common certainty of rationality 1 each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path 1 each time the game is played 1 for example 1 heterogeneous) SCE (Fudenberg and Levine [1996] 7 ). Thus these experiments provide evidence that information about other players' payoffs makes a difference 1 in addition to almost common certainty of the payoffs 1 in section 4 we show that it does correspond to assuming almost common certainty of payoffs and independence. To capture the idea of SCE 1 incorporating restrictions on the priors into the steady-state learning model of Fudenberg and Levine [1993 b] 1 independence is discussed fi.u-ther in section 6.) Combining these assumptions lead to rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium 1 it (like Nash equilibrium) corresponds to a situation in which players have no prior information about the payoff fimctions of their opponents.4 This may be a good approximation of some real-world situations 1 it is also the obvious way to model play in game theory experiments in which subjects are given no itiormation about opponents' payoffs. In other cases 1 it seems plausible that players do have some prior information about their opponents' payoffs. The goal of this paper is to develop a more restrictive version of SCE that incorporates the effects of such prior information. In carrying out this program 1 like ours 1 namely that play corresponds to the steady state of a learning process in which the path is observed each time the game is played 1 one for each player role in the game. The observations of different agents in the same player role may differ depending on the actions they take. If itiormation about the aggregate distribution of outcomes is not available to the subjects 1 or "RSCE." If we think of equilibrium as describing the steady state of a random- matching process of the sort used in most game theory experiments 1 players do not use the prior payoff iniiormation to restrict their beliefs about the play of opponents who have already been observed to deviate from expected play. Intuitively 1 players observe only the actions played by their opponents (as opposed to the complete specification of the opponents' strategies) so that they need never receive evidence that their forecasts of off-path play are incorrect. 3 Because self- confirming equilibrium (henceforth "SCE") allows beliefs about off-path play to be completely arbitrary 1 players were informed of the fimction determining opponents' monetary payoffs. Here 1 ract: In a self-confirming equilibrium 1
more ... less ...
Online availability
All
Free 1 Undetermined 1
Type of publication
All
Article 1 Book / Working Paper 1
Language
All
Undetermined 2
Author
All
Dekel, Eddie 1 Dennis, Ian 1 Evans, Jonathan St. B.T. 1 Fudenberg, Drew 1 Levine, David K. 1 Rolison, Jonathan J. 1 Walsh, Clare R. 1
more ... less ...
Institution
All
ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution (ELSE), Department of Economics 1
Published in...
All
ELSE working papers 1 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1
Source
All
RePEc 2
Showing 1 - 2 of 2
Cover Image
Dual-processes in learning and judgment: Evidence from the multiple cue probability learning paradigm
Rolison, Jonathan J.; Evans, Jonathan St. B.T.; Dennis, Ian - In: Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 118 (2012) 2, pp. 189-202
Multiple cue probability learning (MCPL) involves learning to predict a criterion based on a set of novel cues when feedback is provided in response to each judgment made. But to what extent does MCPL require controlled attention and explicit hypothesis testing? The results of two experiments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576401
Saved in:
Cover Image
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium
Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636460
Saved in:
A service of the
zbw
  • Sitemap
  • Plain language
  • Accessibility
  • Contact us
  • Imprint
  • Privacy

Loading...