Morgan (Public Choice, 116:1-18, 2003) finds that the aggregate effort is greater in sequential than in simultaneous lottery contests. We show that Morgan's result is incorrect due to a slip in a proof, and that the aggregate effort is greater in sequential contests only if contestants are...

We study Colonel Blotto games with sequential battles and a majoritarian objective. For a large class of contest success functions, the equilibrium is unique and characterized by an even split: Each battle that is reached before one of the players wins a majority of battles is allocated the same...

We consider a best-of-three Tullock contest between two ex-ante identical players. An effort-maximizing designer commits to a vector of player-specific biases (advantages or disadvantages). In our benchmark model the designer chooses victory-dependent biases (i.e., the biases depend on the...

We examine theoretically and experimentally how combining between-team and within-team incentives affects behavior in team tournaments. Theory predicts that free-riding is likely to occur when there are only between-team incentives, and offering within-team incentives may solve this problem....

We prove that a tournament with vertices has more than 013(1 + (1)) edge-disjoint transitive triples. We also prove some results on the existence of large packings of -vertex transitive tournaments in an -vertex tournament. Our proofs combine probabilistic arguments and some powerful packing...

This paper experimentally investigates the effect of gender-based affirmative action (AA) on performance in the lab, focusing on a tournament environment. The tournament is based on GRE math questions commonly used in graduate school admission, and at which women are known to perform worse on...

In this paper we obtain sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable set of a weak tournament. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for unique stable sets as well as necessary and sufficient conditions for the stable sets to coincide with cores

Contests, in which contestants compete at their own expenses for prizes offered by a contest holder, have become the foundational primitive of many theories of competition. Recently, the focus in contest research has turned to the role of in-contest performance feedback. The extant literature on...

We study two wage bargaining games between a firm and multiple workers. We revisit the bargaining game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a). We show that, in the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, the gains from trade captured by workers who bargain earlier with the firm are larger than those...

We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded basedon her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank dependent, the equilibrium has a surprisingly explicit...