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  • Search: subject:"Generalized Revelation Principle"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Auction Design 3 Efficiency 3 Generalized Revelation Principle 3 Interdependent Valuations 3 Auktionstheorie 2 Informationsversorgung 2 Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie 2 Agency theory 1 Auction theory 1 Information provision 1
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Online availability
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Free 3
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 3
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 2 Arbeitspapier 1 Graue Literatur 1 Non-commercial literature 1
Language
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English 3
Author
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Mezzetti, Claudio 3
Institution
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Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) 1
Published in...
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Nota di Lavoro 1 Working Papers / Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) 1 Working paper 1
Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 1 EconStor 1 RePEc 1
Showing 1 - 3 of 3
Cover Image
Auction Design with Interdependent Valuations: The Generalized Revelation Principle, Efficiency, Full Surplus Extraction and Information Acquisition
Mezzetti, Claudio - 2003
Agents' valuations are interdependent if they depend on the signals of all agents. Previous literature has claimed that with interdependent valuations and multidimen-sional, but independent, signals, efficient auction design is impossible. This paper shows that, on the contrary, it is always...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325062
Saved in:
Cover Image
Auction Design with Interdependent Valuations: The Generalized Revelation Principle, Efficiency, Full Surplus Extraction and Information Acquisition
Mezzetti, Claudio - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
Agents' valuations are interdependent if they depend on the signals of all agents. Previous literature has claimed that with interdependent valuations and multidimen-sional, but independent, signals, efficient auction design is impossible. This paper shows that, on the contrary, it is always...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230836
Saved in:
Cover Image
Auction design with interdependent valuations : the generalized revelation principle, efficiency, full surplus extraction and information acquisition
Mezzetti, Claudio - 2003
Agents' valuations are interdependent if they depend on the signals of all agents. Previous literature has claimed that with interdependent valuations and multidimen-sional, but independent, signals, efficient auction design is impossible. This paper shows that, on the contrary, it is always...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591188
Saved in:
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