We propose a dynamic auction mechanism for efficiently allocating multiple heterogeneous indivisible goods. These goods can be split into two distinct sets so that items in each set are substitutes but complementary to items in the other set. The seller has a reserve value for each bundle of...

We propose a dynamic auction mechanism for efficiently allocating multiple heterogeneous indivisible goods. These goods can be split into two distinct sets so that items in each set are substitutes but complementary to items in the other set. The seller has a reserve value for each bundle of...

We propose a dynamic auction mechanism for efficiently allocating multiple heterogeneous indivisible goods. These goods can be split into two distinct sets so that items in each set are substitutes but complementary to items in the other set. The seller has a reserve value for each bundle of...

The present paper considers a class of general equilibrium economics when the primitive uncertainty model features uncertainty about continuous-time volatility. This requires a set of mutually singular priors, which do not share the same null sets. For this setting we introduce an appropriate...

The present paper considers a class of general equilibrium economics when the primitive uncertainty model features uncertainty about continuous-time volatility. This requires a set of mutually singular priors, which do not share the same null sets. For this setting we introduce an appropriate...