Search Results - subject:"Group Strategyproofness"

Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange

Velez, Rodrigo - In: Economic Theory 56 (2014) 1, pp. 125-156

-proof. A corollary is that these three basic properties together imply the full requirements of efficiency, consistency, group … strategy-proofness, and reallocation-proofness. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993628

Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped

Manjunath, Vikram - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 43 (2014) 3, pp. 579-597

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010379375

Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange

Velez, Rodrigo A. - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 56 (2014) 1, pp. 125-156

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344328

Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines

Mukherjee, Conan - In: International Journal of Game Theory 42 (2013) 1, pp. 131-163

We first provide the complete characterization of mechanisms that satisfy weak group strategy-proofness and queue …-efficiency, weak group strategy-proofness and continuity. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013 … discontinuity in the transfer map. We then state a necessary condition for mechanisms to satisfy queue-efficiency, weak group …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010845500

Egalitarian division under Leontief Preferences

Li, Jin; Xue, Jingyi - In: Economic Theory 54 (2013) 3, pp. 597-622

which satisfy efficiency, group strategy-proofness, anonymity, resource monotonicity, population monotonicity, envy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993533

Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences

Li, Jin; Xue, Jingyi - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 54 (2013) 3, pp. 597-622

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221866

Group robust stability in matching markets

Oğuz Afacan, Mustafa - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 394-398

We introduce the notion of group robust stability which requires robustness against a combined manipulation, first misreporting preferences and then rematching, by any group of students in the school choice type of matching markets. Our first result shows that there is no group robustly stable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049837

Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions with Binary Ranges and Arbitrary Domains: Characterization Results

Barberà, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the connections …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773128

Circular domains

Sato, Shin - In: Review of Economic Design 14 (2010) 3, pp. 331-342

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008673883

Individual versus group strategy proofedness: when do they coincide?

Barberà, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement … rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. This is the case, for example, when … defining domains of preferences guaranteeing that individual and group strategy-proofness are equivalent for all rules defined …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773123