In a model of simultaneous voting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) consider the possibility that jurors vote strategically, rather than sincerely reflecting their individual information. This results in the counterintuitive result that a jury is more likely to convict the innocent under a...

Considering the environment of risks and influences inherent in the decision-making process for credit-granting operations, it has become a matter of survival for financial organizations to seek to improve how they engage in effective decision-making to ensure that their returns on invested...

We consider dynamic processes of coalition formation in which a principal bargains sequentially with a group of agents. This problem is at the core of a variety of applications in economics and politics, including a lobbyist seeking to pass a bill, an entrepreneur setting up a start-up, or a...

Drawing from conflicts observed in online communities (e.g., astroturfing and shadow banning), I extend Pietraszewski’s theory to accommodate phenomena dependent on the intersubjectivity of groups, where representations of group membership (or beliefs about group membership) diverge. Doing so...

Using a repeated public goods game, we experimentally examine how apologies support mutual cooperation in groups. In two treatments where participants can send either public apologies or private apologies, contributions increase by 0.37 and 0.61 standard deviations respectively, compared to a...

This paper studies career concerns in groups where workers can allocate effort between their own tasks and other group members' tasks. We first theoretically investigate how workers allocate effort when they have career concerns. Then, we study their decisions when the labor market can only...