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  • Search: subject:"Harsanyi doctrine"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Harsanyi doctrine 9 Common prior 3 Game theory 3 Spieltheorie 3 repeated game with incomplete information 3 Belief-free equilibria 2 Generalized type spaces 2 Harsányi Doctrine 2 Quantum games 2 Type spaces 2 belief-free equilibria 2 equilibrium definition 2 heterogeneous priors 2 higher-order beliefs 2 misspecified beliefs 2 naivete 2 Agree to disagree 1 Agreement Theorem 1 Ambiguous language 1 Asymmetric information 1 Asymmetrische Information 1 Bayes-Statistik 1 Bayesian Learning 1 Bayesian inference 1 Behavioral economics 1 Common prior assumption 1 Continuous Payo® 1 Decision under uncertainty 1 Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit 1 Erwartungsbildung 1 Expectation formation 1 Harsanyi Doctrine 1 Harsanyi's Doctrine 1 Imperfect memory 1 Incomplete information 1 Knowledge 1 Language 1 Learning 1 Lernen 1 Optimal insurance 1
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Online availability
All
Free 9
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 11 Article 2
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 3 Arbeitspapier 2 Graue Literatur 2 Non-commercial literature 2 Article in journal 1 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1
Language
All
English 6 Undetermined 6 Hungarian 1
Author
All
Lovo, Stefano 3 Tomala, Tristan 3 Horner, Johannes 2 Kwon, Suehyun 2 Pintér, Miklós 2 Ghossoub, Mario 1 Halpern, Joseph Y. 1 Hörner, Johannes 1 Kets, Willemien 1 Leoni, Patrick 1 Nehring, Klaus 1 Rodrigues Neto, José Alvaro 1 Stefano, LOVO 1
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Institution
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Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 3 HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales) 2 Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1 Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakutät 1 Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) 1
Published in...
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MPRA Paper 3 Les Cahiers de Recherche 2 CESifo Working Paper 1 CESifo working papers 1 Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1 Economic Theory 1 Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 1 Games and economic behavior 1 IEW - Working Papers 1 Working papers in economics and econometrics 1
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Source
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RePEc 9 ECONIS (ZBW) 3 EconStor 1
Showing 1 - 10 of 13
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Behavioral Players in a Game
Kwon, Suehyun - 2019
This paper points out issues with having behavioral players together with fully rational players in a game. One example of behavioral players is naive or sophisticated players; one can study higher-order beliefs when sophistication is the first-order belief, but the paper also considers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012018195
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Behavioral players in a game
Kwon, Suehyun - 2019
This paper points out issues with having behavioral players together with fully rational players in a game. One example of behavioral players is naive or sophisticated players; one can study higher-order beliefs when sophistication is the first-order belief, but the paper also considers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011966920
Saved in:
Cover Image
Common priors for generalized type spaces
Pintér, Miklós - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
The notion of common prior is well-understood and widely-used in the incomplete information games literature. For ordinary type spaces the common prior is defined. Pinter and Udvari (2011) introduce the notion of generalized type space. Generalized type spaces are models for various bonded...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111219
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Cover Image
Common priors for generalized type spaces
Pintér, Miklós - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
The notion of common prior is well-understood and widely-used in the incomplete information games literature. For ordinary type spaces the common prior is defined. Pinter and Udvari (2011) introduce the notion of generalized type space. Generalized type spaces are models for various bonded...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009325601
Saved in:
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The cycles approach
Rodrigues Neto, José Alvaro - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009411467
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Belief heterogeneity in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv insurance model
Ghossoub, Mario - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
In the classical Arrow-Borch-Raviv problem of demand for insurance contracts, it is well-known that the optimal insurance contract for an insurance buyer – or decision maker (DM) – is a deductible contract, when the insurer is a risk-neutral Expected-Utility (EU) maximizer, and when the DM...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260481
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Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence
Horner, Johannes; Lovo, Stefano; Tomala, Tristan - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009
We characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N \ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs across players. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008567725
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Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence
Horner, Johannes; Lovo, Stefano; Tomala, Tristan - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706455
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Ambiguous language and common priors
Halpern, Joseph Y.; Kets, Willemien - In: Games and economic behavior 90 (2015), pp. 171-180
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383922
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Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence
Lovo, Stefano; Tomala, Tristan; Hörner, Johannes - HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales) - 2009
In this paper, the authors characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N \ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008458014
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