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  • Search: subject:"Hierarchical outcome"
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Year of publication
Subject
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hierarchical outcome 13 Myerson value 7 Cooperative TU-game 6 Kooperatives Spiel 6 average tree solution 6 Shapley value 5 Banzhaf value 4 Cooperative game 4 Theorie 4 communication structure 4 component efficiency 4 core 4 externality 4 river game 4 water allocation 4 Shapley-Wert 3 axiomatization 3 collusion neutrality 3 permission value 3 rooted tree 3 Allokationseffizienz 2 Core 2 Externer Effekt 2 Fluss 2 Graphentheorie 2 Nichtkooperatives Spiel 2 Theory 2 Transferable utility 2 Transferierbarer Nutzen 2 Wasserversorgung 2 cycle-free graph game 2 implementation 2 tree game 2 weighted hierarchical outcome 2 Allocation 1 Allocative efficiency 1 Allokation 1 Average tree solution 1 Communication 1 Cycle-free graph game 1
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Online availability
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Free 14
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 14
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 8 Arbeitspapier 4 Graue Literatur 4 Non-commercial literature 4
Language
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English 8 Undetermined 6
Author
All
Brink, René van den 7 Laan, Gerard van der 7 Moes, Nigel 7 Brink, Rene van den 3 Dietz, Chris 3 Xu, Genjiu 3 van der Laan, Gerard 3 van den Brink, Rene 2 van den Brink, René 2
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Institution
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Tinbergen Instituut 4 Tinbergen Institute 2
Published in...
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Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 6 Discussion paper / Tinbergen Institute 4 Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 4
Source
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RePEc 6 ECONIS (ZBW) 4 EconStor 4
Showing 1 - 10 of 14
Cover Image
A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games
van den Brink, Rene; van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel - 2012
the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326336
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Cover Image
A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games
Brink, Rene van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012
hierarchical outcome of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate with other players (i …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257390
Saved in:
Cover Image
A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722639
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Cover Image
Comparable Characterizations of Four Solutions for Permission Tree Games
van den Brink, René; Dietz, Chris; van der Laan, Gerard; … - 2015
game. For cycle-free connected graphs, Demange (2004) introduced for each player the corresponding hierarchical outcome … games the hierarchical outcome with respect to the root of the tree (top player), along with a new solution that assigns all …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491412
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Cover Image
Comparable Characterizations of Four Solutions for Permission Tree Games
Brink, René van den; Dietz, Chris; Laan, Gerard van der; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2015
game. For cycle-free connected graphs, Demange (2004) introduced for each player the corresponding hierarchical outcome … games the hierarchical outcome with respect to the root of the tree (top player), along with a new solution that assigns all …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256471
Saved in:
Cover Image
Comparable characterizations of four solutions for permission tree games
Brink, René van den; Dietz, Chris; Laan, Gerard van der; … - 2015
game. For cycle-free connected graphs, Demange (2004) introduced for each player the corresponding hierarchical outcome … games the hierarchical outcome with respect to the root of the tree (top player), along with a new solution that assigns all …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477095
Saved in:
Cover Image
Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities
van den Brink, Rene; van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel - 2010
In this paper we consider the problem of sharing water from a river among a group of agents (countries, cities, firms) located along the river. The benefit of each agent depends on the amount of water consumed by the agent. An allocation of the water among the agents is efficient when it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325973
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Cover Image
Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities
Brink, Rene van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010
This discussion paper led to a publication in <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069611001574">, 'Journal of Environmental Economics and Management'</A>, 63(3), 388-403.<p>In this paper we consider the problem of sharing water from a river among a group of agents (countries, cities, firms) located along the river. The benefit of each agent depends on...</p></a>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257471
Saved in:
Cover Image
Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities
Brink, Rene van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
In this paper we consider the problem of sharing water from a river among a group of agents (countries, cities, firms) located along the river. The benefit of each agent depends on the amount of water consumed by the agent. An allocation of the water among the agents is efficient when it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008646228
Saved in:
Cover Image
Fair agreements for sharing international rivers with multiple springs and externalities
Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - 2010
In this paper we consider the problem of sharing water from a river among a group of agents (countries, cities, firms) located along the river. The benefit of each agent depends on the amount of water consumed by the agent. An allocation of the water among the agents is efficient when it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011381991
Saved in:
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