This article models how a level of management between workers and the owner of a firm can affect the owner's decision either to internally integrate a function to make inputs or to contract out to buy inputs from an independent supplier. In the model, a self-serving manager can direct her...

This paper draws on two theoretical perspectives — expectation states theory and Goffman's theory of the self and social interaction — to analyze the interactional dynamics by which status hierarchies are maintained. In accounting for the conservative tendencies of social hierarchies, I...

This study evaluates the implementation of a crew chief program. Data from surveys administered both before and after trials in six cities were analyzed. Using an exchange theory model and qualitative literature on workplace teams, hypotheses were generated concerning the pre-existing workplace...

This paper studies the relation between the structure of monitoring hierarchies and corruption, i.e., the expected number of bribed members. The model allows for internal corruption, a form of collusion eliminating accountability (monitoring) in the hierarchy. It is shown that the number of...

In this paper we study situations where asymmetric players have restricted possibilities for communication. Extreme asymmetry results in a hierarchy among the players. We introduce a class of allocation rules for these situations inspired by the Myerson value (Myerson (1977)) and Shapley values...

In this paper we study situations where asymmetric players have restricted possibilities for communication. Extreme asymmetry results in a hierarchy among the players. We introduce a class of allocation rules for these situations inspired by the Myerson value (Myerson (1977)) and Shapley values...