Search Results - subject:"INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY"

Voting and optimal provision of a public good

Shao, Ran; Zhou, Lin - In: Journal of public economics 134 (2016), pp. 35-41

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011654146

Truthful multi-unit multi-attribute double auctions for perishable supply chain trading

Cheng, Meng; Xu, Su Xiu; Huang, George Q. - In: Transportation research / E : an international journal 93 (2016), pp. 21-37

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011556976

Strategic response to a sequence of discrete choice questions

McNair, Ben J.; Bennett, Jeffrey W.; Hensher, David A. - 2010

According to neoclassical economic theory, the only stated preferenceelicitation format that can feasibly be employed in field studies to which truthful responsecan be the dominant strategy for all respondents is a single binary choice between thestatus quo and one alternative. In studies where...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009446029

Effects of alternative elicitation formats in discrete choice experiments

Scheufele, Gabriela; Bennett, Jeffrey W. - 2010

An elicitation format prevalently applied in DCE is to offer each respondent a sequenceof choice tasks containing more than two choice options. However, empirical evidenceindicates that repeated choice tasks influence choice behavior through institutionallearning, fatigue, value learning, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009446038

A comparison of responses to single and repeated discrete choice questions

McNair, Benjamin; Bennett, Jeff; Hensher, David - 2010

According to neoclassical economic theory, a stated preference elicitationformat comprising a single binary choice between the status quo and one alternative isincentive compatible under certain conditions. Formats typically used in choiceexperiments comprising a sequence of discrete choice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009451399

Ambiguity aversion solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility

De Castro, Luciano I.; Yannelis, Nicholas C. - 2010

The conflict between Pareto optimality and incentive compatibility, that is, the fact that some Pareto optimal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282940

A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies

Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Roberto - 2010

, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284046

Evaluating the conditions for robust mechanism design

Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Robert - 2010

three conditions: ex post incentive compatibility, robust monotonicity, and robust measurability. Ex post incentive … that while violations of ex post incentive compatibility and robust monotonicity do not easily go away, we identify a mild … compatibility has been shown to be necessary for any concept of robust implementation, while robust monotonicity and robust …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284054

Government and the provision of public goods : from equilibrium models to mechanism design.

Florenzano, Monique - Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 … - 2010

Focusing on their analysis of the optimal public goods provision problem, this paper follows the parallel development of equilibrium models and mechanism design after the accomodation of Samuelson's definition of collective goods to the general equilibrium framework. Both paradigms lead to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727371

Dynamic Auctions: A Survey

Bergemann, Dirk; Said, Maher - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010

We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents whose private information changes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008505985