We show that efficient anonymous incentive compatible (dominant strategy) mechanisms for public goods eliminate externalities, i.e., each individual is unable to change the welfare of anyone else. The characterization is used to derive existence and non-existence results for models with a finite...

This study explores ordering effects and response strategies in repeated binary discrete choice experiments (DCE). Mechanism design theory and empirical evidence suggest that repeated choice tasks per respondent introduce strategic behavior. We find evidence that the order in which choice sets...

An elicitation format prevalently applied in discrete choice experiments (DCEs) offers each respondent a sequence of choice tasks. Each choice task contains more than two choice options. Empirical evidence shows, however, that repeated choice tasks influence choice behaviour through...

Focussing on their analysis of the optimal public goods provision problems, this paper follows the parallel development of equilibrium models and mechanism design after the accommodation of Samuelson's definition of collective goods to the general equilibrium framework. Both paradigms lead to...

In this paper, we analyze the reason behind the use of foreign ownership restrictions on inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). We extend the results developed in Karabay (2005) by changing the condition on share distribution in the model. Due to this change, we are able to analyze the...

Focussing on their analysis of the optimal public goods provision problem, this paper follows the parallel development of equilibrium models and mechanism design after the accommodation of Samuelson's definition of collective goods to the general equilibrium framework. Both paradigms lead to the...