Implementability conditions in Rochet (1987) are extended to utility functions not necessarily quasilinear in the transfer, or linear in the type, for the case where agents’ information is one-dimensional but actions become multidimensional. The results obtained are relevant for the...

That Congress is corrupt is no secret. Polls show that it is held in very low esteem by the public. Why is that? The effectiveness of voter control of public policy in a system of representative government depends on compatibility of representative incentives with voter preferences. Many...

The seller of N distinct objects is uncertain about the buyer's valuation for those objects. The seller's problem, to maximize expected revenue, consists of maximizing a linear functional over a convex set of mechanisms. A solution to the seller's problem can always be found in an extreme point...

We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core...

We study an adverse selection problem, where an agent is able to understate his productivity, but not allowed to overstate it. The solution to this problem is generally different than the solution to the standard problem, where no restriction is made on the statements of the agent. We identify a...

When future human capital cannot be alienated, households are allowed to borrow up to the point where it is in their own interest not to default. In such a framework, endogenous borrowing limits arise as the outcome of individual rationality constraint. In a model where education is the engine...

When future human capital cannot be alienated, households are allowed to borrow up to the point where it is in their own interest not to default. In such a framework, endogenous borrowing limits arise as the outcome of individual rationality constraint. In a model where education is the engine...

In two experiments on the choice of consumer goods, the estimated marginal willingness to pay for food are found to be lower in the survey version with cheap talk. Our test can be seen as a test of hypothetical bias. This implies we cannot reject the hypothesis of a hypothetical bias for...