The paper surveys theories of the intertemporal allocation of funds through demand deposits and anonymous markets, first separately and then in an integrated model. It reviews some work on the role of market frictions and asset characteristics, and suggests that the interplay between these two...

This paper introduces information aggregation into the standard spatial committee game. We assume that committee members must agree on a decision rule to aggregate their private information on a policy-relevant state of the world. We derive sufficient conditions for the ex ante incentive...

Surveys are frequently used by businesses and governments to elicit information about the public’s preferences. They have become the most common way to gather preference information regarding goods, that are not (or are not yet) bought or sold in markets. In this paper we apply the standard...

This paper introduces information aggregation into the standard spatial committee game. We assume that committee members must agree on a decision rule to aggregate their private information on a policy-relevant state of the world. We derive sucient conditions for the ex ante incentive compatible...

Willingness-to-pay (WTP) data elicited with the help of incentive compatible methods like the Vickrey auction and the BDM mechanism promise higher validity than stated preferences data and provide more information content than do revealed-preferences data. However, research shows that subjects...

Prisoner's dilemmas can lead rational people to interact in ways that lead to persistent inefficiencies. These dilemmas create a problem for institutional designers to solve: devise institutions that realign individual incentives to achieve collectively rational outcomes. I will argue that we do...

Many economics problems are maximization or minimization problems, and can be formalized as problems of solving “linear difference systems” of the form <InlineEquation ID="Equ1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$r_i-r_j \geqq c_{ij}$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> and r <Subscript> k </Subscript>-r <Subscript> l </Subscript> c <Subscript> kl </Subscript>, for r-unknowns, with given c-constants. They typically involve strict as well as weak...</subscript></subscript></subscript></equationsource></inlineequation>