Search Results - subject:"INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY"

Comparative Advantage, Observability, and the Optimal Tax Treatment of Families with Children

Cigno, Alessandro - In: International Tax and Public Finance 8 (2001) 4, pp. 455-470

Children are special, not only to their own parents, but also for society at large. Even if society is not directly interested in children, intervention may still be justified for re-distributive reasons. The fact that children are not transferable, while income is, does in fact bias the first...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005711515

Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility with Aggregate Uncertainty

McLean, Richard; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2001

uncertainty regarding the state of nature, the conflict between incentive compatibility and (ex post) efficiency can be made small … small informational size relative to informational variability. We further show that the conflict between incentive … compatibility and efficiency asymptotically vanishes when an economy is replicated. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150221

An extensive form interpretation of the private core

Muir, Allan; Yannelis, Nicholas C.; Glycopantis, Dionysius - In: Economic Theory 18 (2001) 2, pp. 293-319

The private core of an economy with differential information, (Yannelis (1991)), is the set of all state-wise feasible and private information measurable allocations which cannot be dominated, in terms of ex ante expected utility functions, by state-wise feasible and private information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005155424

Optimal Investment in Knowledge Within a Firm Using a Market Mechanism

Ba, Sulin; Stallaert, Jan; Whinston, Andrew B. - In: Management Science 47 (2001) 9, pp. 1203-1219

There has been an extensive research literature on auctions, but recent developments in technology have resulted in new interest in auction mechanisms as a practical way of allocating resources. This paper presents a new double-auction mechanism to handle resource allocation for public goods...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009218216

Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies

Forges, Françoise; Heifetz, Aviad; Minelli, Enrico - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2001

If the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state-contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706418

Mechanism design in queueing problems

Mitra, Manipushpak - In: Economic Theory 17 (2001) 2, pp. 277-305

A well-known result in incentive theory is that for a very broad class of decision problems, there is no mechanism which achieves truth-telling in dominant strategies, efficiency and budget balancedness (or first best implementability). On the contrary, Mitra and Sen (1998), prove that linear...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753426

Price and Service Discrimination in Queuing Systems: Incentive Compatibility of Gc\mu Scheduling

Mieghem, Jan A. Van - In: Management Science 46 (2000) 9, pp. 1249-1267

. Third, the notions of grade and rate incentive compatibility (IC) are introduced to study this system under asymmetric …. Dynamic Gc\mu scheduling exhibits negative feedback that, together with time-dependent pricing, can also yield rate incentive … compatibility with heterogeneous service times. Finally, multiplan pricing, which offers all customers a menu with a choice of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009191815

Manipulation-proof equilibrium in atomless economies with commodity differentiation

Páscoa, Mário Rui; Hervés-Beloso, Carlos; … - In: Economic Theory 14 (1999) 3, pp. 545-563

behave strategically in endowments and preferences. We apply this coalitional incentive compatibility test to atomless …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596800

Decentralized Supply Chains Subject to Information Delays

Chen, Fangruo - In: Management Science 45 (1999) 8, pp. 1076-1090

We consider a supply chain whose members are divisions of the same firm. The divisions are managed by different individuals with only local inventory information. Both the material and information flows in the supply chain are subject to delays. Under the assumption that the division managers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009197349

Optimal deterministic contracting mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection

Frank H. Page Jr. - In: Review of Economic Design 3 (1997) 1, pp. 1-13

measurable, deterministic contracting mechanisms satisfying the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596591