The public management of stock pollutants is an intertemporal problem; today's optimal choice takes the behavior of future governments into account. If a government expects a successor with different environmental preferences - for instance, if Conservatives expect green successors - it must...

The public management of stock pollutants is an intertemporal problem; today's optimal choice takes the behavior of future governments into account. If a government expects a successor with different environmental preferences - for instance, if Conservatives expect green successors - it must...

The public management of stock pollutants is an intertemporal problem; today's optimal choice takes the behavior of future governments into account. If a government expects a successor with different environmental preferences - for instance, if "Conservatives" expect "green" successors - it must...

Classical power analysis does not involve preferences of players (parties). Classical power indices are constructed under assumption of equal probability of occurrence for each coalition. The paper contains a proposition of relaxation of this assumption, based on extended Shapley–Shubik power...