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  • Search: subject:"Immediately reactive equilibria"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Gradual cooperation 3 Immediately reactive equilibria 3 Kinked demand 3 Additively separable payoffs 2 Prisoners' dilemma 2 Additively separable pay-offs 1 Prisoners'dilemma 1
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Online availability
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Free 2 Undetermined 1
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 2 Article 1
Language
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Undetermined 2 English 1
Author
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Furusawa, Taiji 3 Kamihigashi, Takashi 3
Institution
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Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University 2
Published in...
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Discussion Paper Series / Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University 2 Review of Economic Dynamics 1
Source
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RePEc 3
Showing 1 - 3 of 3
Cover Image
Global Dynamics in Repeated Games with Additively Separable Payoffs
Kamihigashi, Takashi; Furusawa, Taiji - Research Institute for Economics and Business … - 2010
This paper studies the global dynamics of a class of infinitely repeated two-player games in which the action space of each player is an interval, and the one-shot payoff of each player is additively separable in their actions. We define an immediately reactive equilibrium (IRE) as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008542685
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Cover Image
Global Dynamics in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs
Kamihigashi, Takashi; Furusawa, Taiji - Research Institute for Economics and Business … - 2007
This paper studies a class of infinitely repeated games with two players in which the action space of each player is an interval, and the one-shot payoff of each player is additively separable in their actions. We define an immediately reactive equilibrium (IRE) as a pure-strategy subgame...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207857
Saved in:
Cover Image
Global dynamics in repeated games with additively separable payoffs
Kamihigashi, Takashi; Furusawa, Taiji - In: Review of Economic Dynamics 13 (2010) 4, pp. 899-918
This paper studies the global dynamics of a class of infinitely repeated two-player games in which the action space of each player is an interval, and the one-shot payoff of each player is additively separable in actions. We define an immediately reactive equilibrium (IRE) as a pure-strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008455316
Saved in:
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