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  • Search: subject:"Imperfect Decision-Making"
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Year of publication
Subject
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imperfect decision-making 8 judicial 5 Group decisions 4 imperfect decision making 4 Theorie 3 mixed strategies 3 perfect Bayesian equilibrium 3 Adverse Selection 2 Banks 2 Credit Rationing 2 Diagnosis Theory 2 Enforcement 2 Imperfect Decision Making 2 Imperfect Decision-Making 2 Kreditgeschäft 2 Kreditwürdigkeit 2 Maximum Fine Result 2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 2 bounded rationality 2 credit worthiness tests 2 detection skill 2 diagnosis theory 2 rule-governed behavior 2 tax compliance 2 Abstimmungsparadoxon 1 Bayes-Statistik 1 Bayesian inference 1 Decision 1 Deutschland 1 Eigenkapitalvorschriften 1 Entscheidung 1 Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit 1 Equilibrium model 1 Game theory 1 Gerichtsbarkeit 1 Gleichgewichtsmodell 1 Gruppenentscheidung 1 Kreditrationierung 1 Law enforcement 1 Rechtsdurchsetzung 1
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Online availability
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Free 13 Undetermined 2
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 14 Article 2
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 6 Article in journal 1 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1
Language
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English 14 Undetermined 2
Author
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Kirstein, Roland 16 Neunzig, Alexander R. 2 Schmidtchen, Dieter 2 Wangenheim, Georg v. 1 von Wangenheim, Georg 1
Institution
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Forschungsstelle zur ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft 5 Berkeley Electronic Press 1 Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg 1 Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften 1
Published in...
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CSLE Discussion Paper 5 CSLE Discussion Paper Series 5 FEMM Working Papers 1 German Working Papers in Law and Economics 1 Journal of Sports Economics 1 Journal of sports economics 1 MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics 1 MAGKS Papers on Economics 1
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Source
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RePEc 9 EconStor 6 ECONIS (ZBW) 1
Showing 1 - 10 of 16
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A generalized condorcet jury theorem with two independent probabilities of error
Kirstein, Roland; von Wangenheim, Georg - 2010
The Condorcet Jury Theorem is derived from the implicit assumption that jury members only commit one type of error. If the probability of this error is smaller than 0.5, then group decisions are better than those of individual members. In binary decision situations, however, two types of error...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286358
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A Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem with Two Independent Probabilities of Error
Kirstein, Roland; Wangenheim, Georg v. - Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich … - 2010
The Condorcet Jury Theorem is derived from the implicit assumption that jury members only commit one type of error. If the probability of this error is smaller than 0.5, then group decisions are better than those of individual members. In binary decision situations, however, two types of error...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008552453
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Doping, the Inspection Game, and Bayesian Monitoring
Kirstein, Roland - Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft, … - 2009
Doping tests create a signal of whether the athlete has acted fraudulently. If the signal is costly, but perfect, then the doping enforcer and the athlete play an “inspection game," which has no equilibrium in pure strategies. This paper presents a modification of that game: The “Bayesian...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008502496
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Doping, the Inspection Game, and Bayesian Enforcement
Kirstein, Roland - In: Journal of Sports Economics 15 (2014) 4, pp. 385-409
“Bayesian enforcement†assumes that doping tests are imperfect. Moreover, the enforcer is interested in fostering compliant behavior and making correct decisions. Three types of perfect Bayesian equilibria exist, which differ in their punishment styles: “tyrannic,â€...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010942455
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Doping, the inspection game, and Bayesian enforcement
Kirstein, Roland - In: Journal of sports economics 15 (2014) 4, pp. 385-409
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010405147
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The Condorcet Jury-Theorem with Two Independent Error-Probabilities
Kirstein, Roland - 2006
The Condorcet jury-theorem is derived from the implicit assumption that jury members may only commit one type of error. In binary decision situations however, two error types may occur, the probability of which is independent of each other. Taking this into account leads to a generalization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296929
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The Condorcet Jury-Theorem with Two Independent Error-Probabilities
Kirstein, Roland - Forschungsstelle zur ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts, … - 2006
The Condorcet jury-theorem is derived from the implicit assumption that jury members may only commit one type of error. In binary decision situations however, two error types may occur, the probability of which is independent of each other. Taking this into account leads to a generalization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509620
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Bayesian Monitoring.
Kirstein, Roland - 2005
This paper presents a modification of the inspection game: The ?Bayesian Monitoring? model rests on the assumption that judges are interested in enforcing compliant behavior and making correct decisions. They may base their judgements on an informative but imperfect signal which can be generated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296925
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Cover Image
Bayesian Monitoring.
Kirstein, Roland - Forschungsstelle zur ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts, … - 2005
This paper presents a modification of the inspection game: The ?Bayesian Monitoring? model rests on the assumption that judges are interested in enforcing compliant behavior and making correct decisions. They may base their judgements on an informative but imperfect signal which can be generated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509572
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The New Basle Accord, Internal Ratings, and the Incentives of Banks
Kirstein, Roland - 2000
The Basle Accord of 1988 regulates how much equity banks must set aside as a cushion against the default risk. In its 1999 proposal for a new Accord, the Basle Committee seeks to introduce different equity ratios for customers of different risk levels. The proposal strongly favors external...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296912
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