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  • Search: subject:"Incentives contract"
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Year of publication
Subject
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global incentives compatibility 3 incentives compatibility 3 incentives contract 3 quasi-rent 3 quasi-rent appropriation 3 retrievability 3 third party enforcement incentives contract 3 Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie 2 Agency theory 1 Anreiz 1 Anreizvertrag 1 Bus operators 1 Competitive Tendering 1 Cost 1 Fixed price contract 1 Incentives 1 Incentives contract 1 Incentives scheme 1 Leistungsanreiz 1 Performance incentive 1 Public Transport 1 Public Transport Authority 1 Theorie 1 Theory 1 Vertragstheorie 1
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Online availability
All
Free 7
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 7
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 3 Arbeitspapier 1 Graue Literatur 1 Non-commercial literature 1
Language
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Undetermined 4 English 3
Author
All
Fabella, Raul V. 5 Capuno, Joseph J. 1 Vigren, Andreas 1
Institution
All
School of Economics, University of the Philippines at Diliman 3 CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI) 1
Published in...
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UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 3 UPSE Discussion Paper 2 Discussion paper / University of the Philippines, School of Economics 1 Working papers in Transport Economics 1
Source
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RePEc 4 EconStor 2 ECONIS (ZBW) 1
Showing 1 - 7 of 7
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Differential delivery dates, retrievability and the incentives compatibility of contracts
Fabella, Raul V. - 2015
Differential delivery dates (D3) of contract obligations characterize most contracts in real life. D3 puts the contractor who delivers last, in the words of David Hume (1769), in "a position of advantage" because reneging on his/her obligation can be profitable. Ex-ante remedies such as Coase's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335575
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Differential Delivery Dates, Retrievability and the Incentives Compatibility of Contracts
Fabella, Raul V. - School of Economics, University of the Philippines at … - 2015
Differential delivery dates (D3) of contract obligations characterize most contracts in real life. D3 puts the contractor who delivers last, in the words of David Hume (1769), in “a position of advantage” because reneging on his/her obligation can be profitable. Ex-ante remedies such as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261253
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Cover Image
Differential delivery dates, retrievability and the incentives compatibility of contracts
Fabella, Raul V. - 2015
Differential delivery dates (D3) of contract obligations characterize most contracts in real life. D3 puts the contractor who delivers last, in the words of David Hume (1769), in "a position of advantage" because reneging on his/her obligation can be profitable. Ex-ante remedies such as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010530529
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Costs for Swedish public transport authorities in tendered bus contracts
Vigren, Andreas - CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI) - 2014
The main objective of this paper is to investigate how different factors affect costs for Swedish Public Transport Authorities (PTA). A theoretical framework is presented for the empirics, a cross sectional regression analysis with cost and supply data from 20 Swedish counties for the year 2012....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010945093
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Globally incentives-compatible contracts under weak third party enforcement
Fabella, Raul V. - 2005
We explore how the structure of incentives contracts adjusts to the creation of quasi-rents by the delivery of certain types of contract obligations under weak third party enforcement (TPE). The situation invites quasi-rent appropriation by some contractor. We focus on possible ex-post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275087
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Globally Incentives-Compatible Contracts Under Weak Third Party Enforcement
Fabella, Raul V. - School of Economics, University of the Philippines at … - 2005
We explore how the structure of incentives contracts adjusts to the creation of quasi-rents by the delivery of certain types of contract obligations under weak third party enforcement (TPE). The situation invites quasi-rent appropriation by some contractor. We focus on possible ex-post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010667538
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Engendering Local Civic Participation via a Citizen Feedback Mechanism in Bulacan and Davao del Norte
Capuno, Joseph J. - School of Economics, University of the Philippines at … - 2004
This paper presents the educating effects on civic participation of a citizen feedback mechanism (GOFORDEV Index), which helps promote transparency and accountability in local governance. Using three rounds of household survey data collected during the two-year pilot of the Index in two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010667526
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