Search Results - subject:"Incomplete contracts"

The Implications of Sequential Investment in the Property Rights Theory of the Firm

Mai, Maxim - 2008

In the property rights theory of the firm, control over assets (ownership) affords bargaining power in the case of re-negotiation, providing incentives for parties to make relationship specific investments. The models predict that property rights will be allocated so as to maximise surplus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009480075

Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information

Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel - 2008

This paper analyzes bilateral contracting in an environment with contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information. One party (the seller) makes an unverifiable quality choice and the other party (the buyer) has private information about its valuation. A simple exit option contract, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334090

Delegation with incomplete and renegotiable contracts

Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2008

unobservable and incomplete contracts with and without renegotiation opportunities under the assumption that the principal cannot …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012060226

Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives

Bowles, Samuel; Hwang, Sung-Ha - 2008

Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest. But experimental and other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287863

From the human capital defined as "homo oeconomicus rationalis" to that of the rationally bounded and oportunistic "homo contractualis". An institutionalist approach

POHOATA, Ion - In: Review of Economic and Business Studies 1 (2008) December, pp. 129-134

The rationality (its presence or its absence) of the business, be it producer or consumer, has been a constant preoccupation of all those who dedicated their energy and talent on the sinuous road of the history of economic thinking. Without rational behaviour it was inconceivable to determine a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005417648

From Walrasian general equilibrium to incomplete contracts : making sense of institutions

Vahabi, Mehrdad - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

This article explores the specific contribution of recent literature on incomplete contracts in comparison with the … temporary equilibrium framework to overcome some logical incoherences of present incomplete contracts literature. This brings …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111768

Institutions and Contract Enforcement

Falk, Armin; Huffman, David; MacLeod, W. Bentley - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a … behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong … they are embedded. JEL Classification: J41, J3, C9, D01 Keywords: incomplete contracts, bonus pay, efficiency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763505

Love and taxes - and matching institutions

Konrad, Kai A.; Lommerud, Kjell Erik - Abteilung "Marktprozesse und Steuerung", … - 2008

We study a setting with search frictions in the marriage market and with incomplete contracting inside the family. Everyone prefers a partner that has high income and is a perfect emotional match, but compromises must often be struck. A high income earner may abstain from marrying a low-income...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009367887

Social Preferences and Public Economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives

Bowles, Samuel; Hwang, Sung Ha - Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts-Amherst - 2008

, (public goods) Keywords: Social preferences, implementation theory, incentive contracts, incomplete contracts, framing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005018010

Will Privatization Reduce Costs?

Lindqvist, Erik - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2008

I develop a model of public sector contracting based on the multitask framework by Holmström and Milgrom (1991). In this model, an agent can put effort into increasing the quality of a service or reducing costs. Being residual claimants, private owners have stronger incentives to cut costs than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645363