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  • Search: subject:"Indivisible objects"
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Year of publication
Subject
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strategy-proofness 15 indivisible objects allocation 13 resource-monotonicity 13 indivisible objects 9 Allocation 6 Allokation 6 Indivisible goods 6 Unteilbare Güter 6 deferred-acceptance-algorithm 6 population-monotonicity 5 Indivisible objects 4 Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion 4 Strategy-proofness 4 Theorie 4 consistency 4 Deferred-acceptance-algorithm 3 Indivisible objects allocation 3 Neue politische Ökonomie 3 Public choice 3 Social welfare function 3 Theory 3 multiple tie-breaking 3 school choice 3 Deferred-acceptance mechanism 2 Game theory 2 Package assignment 2 Spieltheorie 2 deferred-acceptance algorithm 2 deferred-acceptance mechanism 2 resourcemonotonicity 2 weak non-wastefulness 2 Acyclical priority structures 1 Composition down 1 Composition up 1 Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit 1 Erwartungsnutzen 1 Hiding-proofness 1 Hierarchie 1 Hierarchy 1 Mechanism design 1
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Online availability
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Free 31
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 30 Article 1
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 7 Arbeitspapier 5 Graue Literatur 5 Non-commercial literature 5 Article in journal 1 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1
Language
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Undetermined 19 English 12
Author
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Klaus, Bettina 14 EHLERS, Lars 12 KLAUS, Bettina 12 Ehlers, Lars 8 Ehlers, Lars H. 4 Erlanson, Albin 2 Szwagrzak, Karol 2 Atlamaz, Murat 1 Ehlers, Klaus 1 Hamers, Herbert 1 Hatsumi, Kentaro 1 Klijn, Flip 1 Liu, Peng 1 Serizawa, Shigehiro 1 Slikker, Marco 1 Velzen, Bas van 1 Xu, Sijia 1
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Institution
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Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie Quantitative (CIREQ) 7 Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de Montréal 7 Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 4 Départment d'économétrie et d'économie politique (DEEP), Faculté des Hautes Études Commerciales (HEC) 3 Harvard Business School, Harvard University 1 Institut for Virksomhedsledelse og Økonomi, Syddansk Universitet 1
Published in...
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Cahiers de recherche 14 UFAE and IAE Working Papers 4 Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 3 Cahiers de recherches économiques 3 Cahier / Départment de Sciences Économiques, Université de Montréal 2 Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 1 Economics letters 1 Harvard Business School Working Papers 1 ISER Discussion Paper 1 Working Paper 1
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Source
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RePEc 23 ECONIS (ZBW) 6 EconStor 2
Showing 1 - 10 of 31
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Packaging for allocation
Liu, Peng; Xu, Sijia - In: Economics letters 243 (2024), pp. 1-4
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015080451
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Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics
Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina - Départment d'économétrie et d'économie politique … - 2014
We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011099334
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Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance : Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics
EHLERS, Lars; KLAUS, Bettina - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2014
We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011122151
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Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
EHLERS, Lars; KLAUS, Bettina - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2014
We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186242
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Strategy-proof package assignment
Erlanson, Albin; Szwagrzak, Karol - Institut for Virksomhedsledelse og Økonomi, Syddansk … - 2014
We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple divisible and indivisible resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. We find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010750277
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Object allocation via deferred-acceptance : strategy-proofness and comparative statics
Ehlers, Lars H.; Klaus, Bettina - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011313343
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Object allocation via deferred-acceptance : strategy-proofness and comparative statics
Ehlers, Lars H.; Klaus, Bettina - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532727
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Strategy-Proof Package Assignment
Erlanson, Albin; Szwagrzak, Karol - 2013
We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple divisible and indivisible resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. We find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208670
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House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance
EHLERS, Lars; KLAUS, Bettina - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2013
We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186232
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House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance
Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2013
We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883525
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