EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • A-Z
  • Beta
  • About EconBiz
  • News
  • Thesaurus (STW)
  • Academic Skills
  • Help
  •  My account 
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • Login
EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
Publications Events
Search options
Advanced Search history
My EconBiz
Favorites Loans Reservations Fines
    You are here:
  • Home
  • Search: subject:"Indivisible objects allocation"
Narrow search

Narrow search

Year of publication
Subject
All
strategy-proofness 15 indivisible objects allocation 14 resource-monotonicity 9 Allocation 7 Allokation 7 Indivisible goods 7 Unteilbare Güter 7 deferred-acceptance-algorithm 6 Social welfare function 5 Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion 5 population-monotonicity 5 Deferred-acceptance-algorithm 4 Indivisible objects allocation 4 Neue politische Ökonomie 4 Public choice 4 multiple tie-breaking 4 school choice 4 Game theory 3 Spieltheorie 3 Strategy-proofness 3 deferred-acceptance mechanism 3 Deferred-acceptance mechanism 2 Mechanism design 2 Mechanismus-Design-Theorie 2 Resource-monotonicity 2 School choice 2 Schulauswahl 2 Theorie 2 Theory 2 consistency 2 deferred-acceptance algorithm 2 resourcemonotonicity 2 weak non-wastefulness 2 Multiple tie-breaking 1 Population-monotonicity 1 deferred-acceptance-algorith 1
more ... less ...
Online availability
All
Free 16 Undetermined 1
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 16 Article 2
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Arbeitspapier 5 Graue Literatur 5 Non-commercial literature 5 Working Paper 5 Article in journal 2 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 2
Language
All
Undetermined 11 English 7
Author
All
Klaus, Bettina 12 EHLERS, Lars 6 Ehlers, Lars H. 6 KLAUS, Bettina 6 Ehlers, Lars 5 Ehlers, Klaus 1
Institution
All
Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie Quantitative (CIREQ) 4 Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de Montréal 4 Départment d'économétrie et d'économie politique (DEEP), Faculté des Hautes Études Commerciales (HEC) 3
Published in...
All
Cahiers de recherche 8 Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 3 Cahiers de recherches économiques 3 Cahier / Départment de Sciences Économiques, Université de Montréal 2 Games and economic behavior 1 Mathematics of operations research 1
Source
All
RePEc 11 ECONIS (ZBW) 7
Showing 1 - 10 of 18
Cover Image
Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics
Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina - Départment d'économétrie et d'économie politique … - 2014
We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011099334
Saved in:
Cover Image
Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance : Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics
EHLERS, Lars; KLAUS, Bettina - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2014
We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011122151
Saved in:
Cover Image
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
EHLERS, Lars; KLAUS, Bettina - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2014
We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186242
Saved in:
Cover Image
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance : strategy-proofness and comparative statics
Ehlers, Lars H.; Klaus, Bettina - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011313343
Saved in:
Cover Image
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance : strategy-proofness and comparative statics
Ehlers, Lars H.; Klaus, Bettina - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532727
Saved in:
Cover Image
House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance
EHLERS, Lars; KLAUS, Bettina - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2013
We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186232
Saved in:
Cover Image
House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance
Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2013
We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883525
Saved in:
Cover Image
House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance
Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina - Départment d'économétrie et d'économie politique … - 2013
We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010682998
Saved in:
Cover Image
House allocation via deferred-acceptance
Ehlers, Lars H.; Klaus, Bettina - 2013
We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222190
Saved in:
Cover Image
House allocation via deferred-acceptance
Ehlers, Klaus; Klaus, Bettina - 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010188266
Saved in:
  • 1
  • 2
  • Next
  • Last
A service of the
zbw
  • Sitemap
  • Plain language
  • Accessibility
  • Contact us
  • Imprint
  • Privacy

Loading...