We assume that a project requires an initial outlay and may either succeed or fail. The probability of success depends on its type and on the effort of the firm. Only in the case of success do private and external benefits appear. The paper analyzes the optimal design of subsidies under...

We assume that a project requires an initial outlay and may either succeed or fail. The probability of success depends on its type and on the effort of the firm. Only in the case of success do private and external benefits appear. The paper analyzes the optimal design of subsidies under...

In a two-sided asymmetric information market, the role of the accuracy of consumers' imperfect and private information on the level of fraud, incidence of fraud and trade under price rigidity is examined. Consumers receive a costless but noisy private signal of quality. The product offered in...

In a two-sided asymmetric information market, the role of the accuracy of consumers' imperfect and private information on the level of fraud, incidence of fraud and trade under price rigidity is examined. Consumers receive a costless but noisy private signal of quality. The product offered in...