Search Results - subject:"Informational externalities"

On the optimality of rivacy in sequential contracting

Calzolari, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro - 2005

This paper studies the exchange of information between two principals who contract sequentially with the same agent, as in the case of a buyer who purchases from multiple sellers. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the downstream level of trade, (b) the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266304

On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting

Calzolari, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588620

On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting

Calzolari, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro - 2004

This paper considers an environment where two principals sequentially contract with a common agent and studies the exchange of information between the two bilateral relationships. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the decisions taken by the downstream...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266292

On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting

Calzolari, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270336

On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting

Calzolari, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2004

Numbers: D82, C73, L1. Keywords: contractual and informational externalities, mechanism design, optimal disclosure policy … (informational externalities). In this paper we investigate how a principal should control for both informational and contractual …, we combine direct externalities with informational externalities and show how they are optimally fashioned through the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588245

Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write?

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo; Postlewaite, Andrew - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2003

We find an economic rationale for the common-sense answer to the question in our title ¿ courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyse a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. An active court can improve on the outcome that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071372

Cooperative games with incomplete information: Some open problems

Forges, Françoise; Serrano, Roberto - Instituto de Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Madrileño de … - 2011

This is a brief survey describing some of the recent progress and open problems in the area of cooperative games with incomplete information. We discuss exchange economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of cooperation in non-cooperative Bayesian games.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009278195

Bayesian social learning with local interactions

Guarino, Antonio; Ianni, Antonella - In: Games 1 (2010) 4, pp. 438-458

We study social learning in a large population of agents who only observe the actions taken by their neighbours. Agents have to choose one, out of two, reversible actions, each optimal in one, out of two, unknown states of the world. Each agent chooses rationally, on the basis of private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752451

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2009

We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title - courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. An active court can improve on the outcome that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102105

Allocative and Productive Efficiency in REE with Asymetric Information

VIVES, XAVIER - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2000

We characterize the divergence between informational and economic efficiency in a rational expectations competitive market with asymmetric information about the costs of production. We find that prices may contain too much or too little information with respect to incentive efficient allocations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247846