We study a class of deceptively similar games, which however have different player sets and predictions that vary with their cardinality. The economic, biological, political, and psychological applications are many. The game-theoretic principles involved are compelling as predictions rely on...

We study a class of deceptively similar games, which however have different player sets and predictions that vary with their cardinality. The economic, biological, political, and psychological applications are many. The game-theoretic principles involved are compelling as predictions rely on...

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out...

This paper proposes a general incomplete information framework for studying behavior in strategic games with stepwise (viz. `level-k' or `cognitive hierarchy') thinking, which has been found to describe strategic behavior well in experiments involving players' initial responses to games. It is...

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We compare unawareness with probability zero belief. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the...

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We compare unawareness with probability zero belief. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the...

Let S be a set of logically related propositions, and suppose a jury must decide the truth/falsehood of each member of S. A `judgement aggregation rule' (JAR) is a rule for combining the truth valuations on S from each juror into a collective truth valuation on S. Recent work has shown that...

An example is given in which agents agree to disagree, showing that Aumann's (1976) Agreement Theorem does not extend to a countable space of equiprobable states of nature. Even in this unorthodox setting, if the sets of the information partitions are intervals, an agreement theorem holds. A...