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  • Search: subject:"Interim Incentive Constraints"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Agency theory 3 Asymmetric information 3 Asymmetrische Information 3 Mechanism design 3 Mechanismus-Design-Theorie 3 Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie 3 Anreiz 2 Dynamic Mechanism Design 2 Dynamic mechanism design 2 Incentives 2 Interim Incentive Constraints 2 Interim Participation Constraints 2 Observable Arrival 2 Option Value 2 Progressive Participation 2 Repeated Sales 2 Stopping Problem 2 Unobservable Arrival 2 interim incentive constraints 2 interim participation constraints 2 observable arrival 2 option value 2 progressive participation 2 repeated sales 2 stopping problem 2 unobservable arrival 2
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Online availability
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Free 3 CC license 1 Undetermined 1
Type of publication
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Article 2 Book / Working Paper 2
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Arbeitspapier 2 Graue Literatur 2 Non-commercial literature 2 Working Paper 2 Article 1 Article in journal 1 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1
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Language
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English 4
Author
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Bergemann, Dirk 4 Strack, Philipp 4
Published in...
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Cowles Foundation discussion paper 1 Discussion papers / CEPR 1 Theoretical Economics 1 Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory 1
Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 3 EconStor 1
Showing 1 - 4 of 4
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Progressive participation
Bergemann, Dirk; Strack, Philipp - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 3, pp. 1007-1039
A single seller faces a sequence of buyers with unit demand. The buyers are forward-looking and long-lived. Each buyer has private information about his arrival time and valuation where the latter evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion. Any incentive-compatible mechanism has to induce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536925
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Cover Image
Progressive participation
Bergemann, Dirk; Strack, Philipp - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 3, pp. 1007-1039
A single seller faces a sequence of buyers with unit demand. The buyers are forward-looking and long-lived. Each buyer has private information about his arrival time and valuation where the latter evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion. Any incentive-compatible mechanism has to induce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013327107
Saved in:
Cover Image
Progressive participation
Bergemann, Dirk; Strack, Philipp - 2019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012053245
Saved in:
Cover Image
Progressive participation
Bergemann, Dirk; Strack, Philipp - 2020
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012253939
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