We study how international environmental agreements can take advantage of domestic time-inconsistency problems. Policymakers often prefer future policies to be sustainable, but are tempted to invest less when being in office. We find the equilibrium number of signatory countries to be higher...

The present endeavour attempts to assess the impact of increased carbon emissions on the global mean annual temperature by employing an autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) on time series data for 1970-2020. The study aims to predict the expected increase in global mean temperature until...

A two-tier climate club exploits the comparative advantage of large countries to mete out punishments through trade, while taking their capacity to resist punishment as a constraint. Countries outside the coalition price carbon at a fixed fraction of the average carbon price adopted within the...

Since the mid-1980s, the international community has controlled refrigerants that may damage the ozone layer and cause climate change based on several international agreements. In particular, the Montreal Protocol contributed to not only solving the ozone layer depletion problem but also...

In the standard theoretical literature on forming international environmental agreements (IEAs) countries use to be self-interested materialists and stable coalitions are small. This paper analyzes IEA games with countries that exhibit Kantian moral behavior. Countries may behave morally with...