Search Results - subject:"Intuitive criterion"

The Intuitive and Divinity Criterion: Interpretation and Step-by-Step Examples

Munoz-Garcia, Felix; Espinola-Arredondo, Ana - In: Journal of Industrial Organization Education 5 (2011) 1, pp. 1-20

The paper presents an intuitive explanation of the Cho and Kreps (1987) Intuitive Criterion, and the Banks and Sobel … the Cho and Kreps (1987) Intuitive Criterion does not restrict the set of equilibria, while the Banks and Sobels (1987 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014613579

Third-party intervention in conflicts and the indirect samaritan's dilemma

Amegashie, J. Atsu - 2009

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants. The third party is fully informed about the type of her ally but not about the type of her ally's enemy. There is a signaling game between the third party and her ally's enemy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270600

Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan’s Dilemma

Amegashie, J. Atsu - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2009

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants. The third party is fully informed about the type of her ally but not about the type of her ally’s enemy. There is a signaling game between the third party and her ally’s...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008558431

Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan's Dilemma

Amegashie, J. Atsu - CESifo - 2009

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants. The third party is fully informed about the type of her ally but not about the type of her ally’s enemy. There is a signaling game between the third party and her ally’s...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005034639

Job market signaling and employer learning

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Prat, Julien - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268897

Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Prat, Julien - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

employees over time. Contrary to the model without employer learning, we find that the Intuitive Criterion does not always … select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the …, we find that the Intuitive Criterion does not always select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822317

Non-hierarchical signalling: two-stage financing game

Miglo, Anton; Zenkevich, Nikolay - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005

The literature analyzing games where some players have private information about their "types" is usually based on the duality of "good" and "bad" types (GB approach), where "good" type denotes the type with better quality. In contrast, this paper analyzes a signalling game without types...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005836424

Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games

Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen; Jensen, Mogens; Sloth, Birgitte - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 1999

We study equilibrium selection by evolutionary learning in monotone signalling games. The learning process is a development of that introduced by Young for static games extended to deal with incomplete information and sequential moves; it thus involves stochastic trembles. For vanishing trembles...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749753

Deviations, Dynamics and Equilibrium Refinements

Rabin, Matthew; Sobel, Joel - Institute of Business and Economic Research (IBER), … - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010843336

Signaling, Globality, and the Intuitive Criterion

Ewerhart, Christian; Wichardt, Philipp - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

A global signaling game is a sender-receiver game in which the sender is only imperfectly informed about the receiver's preferences. The paper considers an economically relevant class of signaling games that possess more than one Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. For this class of games, it is shown...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627869