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  • Search: subject:"Iterative deletion procedure"
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Year of publication
Subject
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choice rule 5 epistemic game theory 5 Iterative deletion procedure 4 Game theory 3 Spieltheorie 3 common belief 3 Neue politische Ökonomie 2 Public choice 2 iterative deletion procedure 2 order independence 2 Choice rule 1 Common belief 1 Epistemic game theory 1
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Online availability
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Free 2 Undetermined 2
Type of publication
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Article 3 Book / Working Paper 3
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Article in journal 2 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 2 Working Paper 2 Arbeitspapier 1 Graue Literatur 1 Non-commercial literature 1
Language
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English 4 Undetermined 2
Author
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Trost, Michael 5 TROST, MICHAEL 1
Institution
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Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena 1
Published in...
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2 Games and economic behavior 1 International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 1 International game theory review 1 Jena economics research papers 1
Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 3 RePEc 2 EconStor 1
Showing 1 - 6 of 6
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On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules
Trost, Michael - In: Games and economic behavior 116 (2019), pp. 1-37
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012225903
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On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules
Trost, Michael - 2014
One central issue tackled in epistemic game theory is whether for a general class of strategic games the solution generated by iterated application of a choice rule gives exactly the strategy profiles that might be realized by players who follow this choice rule and commonly believe they follow...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500159
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On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules
Trost, Michael - 2014 - This version: November 25, 2014
One central issue tackled in epistemic game theory is whether for a general class of strategic games the solution generated by iterated application of a choice rule gives exactly the strategy profiles that might be realized by players who follow this choice rule and commonly believe they follow...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010475615
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On the Equivalence between Iterated Application of Choice Rules and Common Belief of Applying these Rules
Trost, Michael - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
One central issue tackled in epistemic game theory is whether for a general class of strategic games the solution generated by iterated application of a choice rule gives exactly the strategy profiles that might be realized by players who follow this choice rule and commonly believe they follow...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011082353
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AN EPISTEMIC RATIONALE FOR ORDER INDEPENDENCE
TROST, MICHAEL - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 16 (2014) 01, pp. 1440002-1
The issue of the order dependence of iterative deletion procedures is well known in the game theory community, and conditions on the dominance concept underlying these procedures have meanwhile been detected which ensure order independence (see, e.g., the criteria of Gilboa et al. (1990) and Apt...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011011333
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An epistemic rationale for order independence
Trost, Michael - In: International game theory review 16 (2014) 1, pp. 1-37
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010385671
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