Search Results - subject:"Job Search Monitoring"

Is it socially efficient to impose job search requirements on unemployed benefit claimants with hyperbolic preferences?

Cockx, Bart; Ghirelli, Corinna; Van der Linden, Bruno - In: Journal of Public Economics 113 (2014) C, pp. 80-95

DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) and Paserman (2008) have shown that imposing job search requirements on sophisticated unemployed benefit claimants with hyperbolic time preferences is Pareto improving in that it raises welfare for the unemployed, by limiting harmful procrastination, and for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010776967

Is it socially efficient to impose job search requirements on unemployed benefit claimants with hyperbolic preferences?

Cockx, Bart; Ghirelli, Corinna; Van der Linden, Bruno - In: Journal of public economics 113 (2014), pp. 80-95

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010390957

Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs

Pavoni, Nicola; Violante, Giovanni L - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

unemployed (e.g., unemployment insurance, job search monitoring, social assistance, wage subsidies). This paper provides a …. The optimal benefits are decreasing during unemployment insurance and constant during both job search monitoring and … insurance, they must decrease (increase) during a phase of job search monitoring. In a calibration exercise, we use our model to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661766