College-educated workers in jobs unrelated to their degree generally receive lower wages compared to well-matched workers. Our analysis of data from the National Survey of College Graduates shows that although the rate of this mismatch declined only slightly (19% to 17%), the wage penalty...

I build a tractable random search model with firm dynamics, on-the-job search, and aggregate shocks. Multi-worker firms make recruitment decisions, choose whether to enter or exit the market, and design wage contracts. Tractability is obtained by showing that, under a set of assumptions on the...

This paper studies the problem of a monopolistic platform which matches agents with private types representing their heterogeneous skills and resources. An agent finds a positive value in subscription to the platform when matched with another agent who has a resource which complements his skill....

This paper analyzes the matching of agents with private information that they can disclose to a central authority/public. They do this via discriminatory signals, i.e., evidence, based on which the matching is determined. For one-dimensional characteristics, I demonstrate that the...

We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations. In such markets, we establish the efficiency of equilibrium arrangements and study conditions on the distributional constraints and agent...

On-the-job search is increasingly recognized as an important potential driver of labor market dynamics over the business cycle. Using the UK Labor Force Survey, we find robust empirical evidence that on-the-job search is countercyclical, and that the cyclical fluctuations have important...

This paper explores the implications of the mismatch hypothesis in the context of the labor market using a survey on newly licensed US lawyers called the After the JD Study. Using a triple difference approach, I measure the impact of diversity quotas on marginal minority workers’ future...

This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market...

We study the matching mechanism in a two-stage game that mixes two well-known matching mechanisms, Boston Mechanism(BM) and the Deferred Acceptance algorithm(DA). First, we show that if all organizations have the same preferences for agents they accept, the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of...

This paper shares results from an online experiment to assess whether working women face a penalty in the marriage market in India. Using a randomized controlled trial on a popular Indian matchmaking website, I find that profiles of women who signal wanting to work after marriage receive upto 22...