Lotteries are a common way to resolve ties in assignment mechanisms that ration resources. We consider a model with a continuum of agents and a finite set of resources with heterogeneous qualities, where the agents' preferences are generated from a multinomial-logit (MNL) model based on the...

Objects of different quality are to be allocated to agents. Agents can receive at most one object, and there are not enough high-quality objects for every agent. The value to the social planner from allocating objects to any given agent depends on that agent's private information. The social...

Manipulability is a threat to the successful design of centralized matching markets. However, in many applications some manipulation is inevitable and the designer wants to compare manipulable mechanisms to select the best among them. We count the number of agents with an incentive to manipulate...

Changing distributions of male and female types affect the measurement of educationbased marriage market sorting. We develop a weighting strategy that minimizes the distortion of sorting measures due to changing type distributions. The optimal weights reflect that female type distributions have...

In this study, we introduce a novel entity matching (EM) framework. It com-bines state-of-the-art EM approaches based on Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) with a new similarity encoding derived from matching techniques that are preva-lent in finance and economics. Our framework is on-par or...

This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that a stable matching exists in a discrete matching market when the firms' preference profile satisfies...