This paper tries to prove that the outcomes stemming from interactions on assignment markets bring about coordination in case of a stochastic matching subject to various forms of expectations. We consider an exchange network with stochastic matching between the pairs of players and analyze the...

The first step in a worker's career is often particularly hard. Many firms seeking workers require experience in a related field, so a vicious circle is created, whereby an entry level job is required in order to get an entry level job. Consequently, entrant workers have lower job-finding rates...

Firms and workers predominately match via job postings, networks of personal contacts or the public employment agency, all of which help to ameliorate labor market frictions. In this paper we investigate the extent to which these search channels have differential effects on labor market...

Workers separate from jobs, search for jobs, accept jobs, and fund consumption with their wages. Firms recruit workers to fill vacancies, but search frictions prevent firms from instantly hiring available workers. Unemployment persists. These features are described by the...

A standard endogenous separation model developed by Mortensen and Pissarides [1994] has a drawback in replicating the negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies. To address this, I extend the model by incorporating wage rigidity and modifying the assumption about idiosyncratic...

This document provides additional results for Mitra, Seo, and Xu (2023). Section A compares wages in the economies with and without risk premia. Section B extends the equivalence result to a setting with heterogeneous worker productivity

We provide a general framework to consider the effects of algorithmic demand and supply prediction in matching platforms, such as Task Rabbit for labor markets or Amazon for goods markets, where a significant proportion of matches are repeat transactions. We show that algorithmic repeat match...

We develop a principal/agent model for matching agents in two-sided assignments. A principal has preferences over all agents' assignments, and agents have privately-known preferences about their own match (but are indifferent about others'). Unhappy agents can quit, but the principal can stop...

Typical measures of wages, such as average hourly earnings, fail to capture cyclicality in the effective cost of labor in the presence of (i) cyclical fluctuations in the quality of worker-firm matches, or (ii) wages being smoothed within employment matches. To address both concerns, we estimate...

In the United States, prospective foster parents must become licensed by a child welfare agency before a foster child can be placed in their care. This paper contributes by developing a theoretical matching model to study the optimal menu of licenses designed to screen foster parents. We...