The large markets model with a continuum of agents has been a major methodological innovation for studying real-life assignment problems. In this paper I study the following question: if we sample random finite economies from a continuum economy, will the Deferred Acceptance (DA) assignment of...

Waitlists are commonly used to allocate scarce resources such as organs. Waitlist policies attempt to ensure fairness toward agents who wait longer by assigning them priority points (`a la first-come first-served). We show that such point systems can lead to severe inequality across the...

I show that the continuous choice version of the low skill trap model of Burdett and Smith (2002) has a unique equilibrium if the matching function has constant returns to scale with respect to unemployment and vacancies. If the returns are not constant, a unique equilibrium exists if the...

We use the score reports of 375,000 U.S.-based GMAT test takers to document patterns of mismatch between student ability and school quality. We find substantial levels of mismatch in candidates’ selection of MBA programs for score-sending, and by extension, applications. The evidence suggests...

The paper attacks the central policy evaluation question of forecasting the impact of interventions never previously experienced. It introduces treatment effects approach into a cognitive domain not currently spanned by its methodological arsenal. Existing causal effects bounding analysis is...

This paper develops a matching model à la Pissarides (2000) to analyze the migrant smuggling market, building on the empirical evidence related to the smuggling of migrants from the Horn of Africa and the Middle East to the European region in the last decade. The model allows us to determine...

We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities, e.g., labor and rental housing markets, in which money can exchange hands between agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations. In such markets, we establish the efficiency of...

Commitment exists in various contexts and forms in economics. It appears in a particularwayin dynamic many-to-one matching markets when matchings are irreversible: Institutionsmaycommit to matching with specific agents early on to affect the subsequent matchingmarket in their favor. This paper...

In the matching mechanism of incomplete information, the preferences and endowment of players change with the types of players. Before insight into the state of nature, the player cannot be certain of the types of other players. Based on Cornes and Hartley's aggregative game approach, this paper...

We simplify the stability notion for the two-sided, one-to-one matching setting in distributional form of Greinecker and Kah (2021). Their stability notion uses the product measure of a matching with itself and requires a certain ``instability'' set to be null. In contrast, our definition of...