This study examines the economic consequences of non-financial measures of performance in contracts between health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and primary care physicians (PCPs). HMOs have expanded contractual arrangements to give physicians not only financial incentives to control costs,...

This study explores the dynamic structure of the pay-for- performance relationship in CEO compensation and quantifies the effect of introducing a more complex model of firm financial performance on the estimated performance sensitivity of executive pay. The results suggest that current...

From the perspective of a transport service buyer and at the abstraction level of material flows, all transports travel directly from product supplier to product customer. In reality, however, the directness of transport services depends on factors such as geography, available infrastructure,...

Objective measures of performance are seldom perfect. In response, incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures. This paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures...