Firms' inability to monitor their employees' search effort forces a tradeoff between risk-bearing and incentive considerations when designing employment-related insurance. Since the provision of insurance against firm-specific shocks adversely affects workers' incentives to find better jobs, the...

This paper studies quarterly employment flows of approximately 10,000 large U.S. manufacturing establishments during 1972:1-1980:4.After estimating the extent of short run microeconomic substitution between employment and hours per worker (hours-week), we construct measures of the path of the...

Using two types of overlapping generations (OLG) model, we show that involuntary unemployment is in a Nash equilibrium of a game with a firm and consumers, and we can achieve full-employment by fiscal policy financed by seignorage not tax. Once we achieve it, it is maintained without government...

Efficiency wage models of the effort elicitation type have important implications for labor market dynamics. These models have a wide array of discontinuous sunspot equilibria driven by extraneous variables, in addition to well-behaved equilibria characterized by continuous, slowly adjusting...

This study explores what determines employers' violations of the wage contracts of workers on H-1B temporary work visas, which occur when firms pay those workers below the promised prevailing or "market" wage. A theoretical framework is proposed that predicts more violations during economic...

A common feature to most aggregative studies of the labor market is a marginal productivity expression in which the quantity of labor appears on the left hand side of the equation, and the right hand side includes the real wage and output. A number of researchers have cautioned that if the...

This paper develops a model of human capital investment in a frictional labor market with two-sided heterogeneity and liquidity constraints. The model generates underemployment in equilibrium: workers are employed in jobs for which they are over-qualified. Subsidizing education can decrease the...

Using an experiment, we investigate whether job candidates’ noncontractible effort promises increase their actual effort in the work relationship when the labor market is competitive. Due to promise-keeping preferences, individuals tend to keep promises even if doing so is costly. However,...