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  • Search: subject:"Legislative Rules"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Fiscal Policy 6 Fragmentation 6 Legislative Rules 6 Referendums 6 Budget Rules 4 Finanzpolitik 3 Haushaltskonsolidierung 3 Referendum 3 Regierung 3 Regierungskoalition 3 Schweiz 3 Staatsquote 3 budget rules 3 fiscal policy 3 fragmentation 3 legislative rules 3 referendums 3 Formal fiscal restraints 2 Regelgebundene Politik 2 Coalition government 1 Fiscal consolidation 1 Fiscal policy 1 Government 1 Government size 1 Regelbindung versus Diskretion 1 Rules versus discretion 1 Switzerland 1
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Online availability
All
Free 9
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 9
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 5 Arbeitspapier 1 Graue Literatur 1 Non-commercial literature 1
Language
All
English 7 Undetermined 2
Author
All
Feld, Lars P. 9 Schaltegger, Christoph A. 9
Institution
All
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) 2 CESifo 1 Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften 1
Published in...
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CREMA Working Paper 2 CREMA Working Paper Series 2 CESifo Working Paper 1 CESifo Working Paper Series 1 CESifo working papers 1 Marburg Working Papers on Economics 1 Marburger Volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge 1
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Source
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EconStor 4 RePEc 4 ECONIS (ZBW) 1
Showing 1 - 9 of 9
Cover Image
Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence on Institutional Restraints on the Fiscal Commons Problem for Swiss Cantons
Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Feld, Lars P. - 2008
The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different fiscal or constitutional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168288
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Cover Image
Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence on Institutional Restraints on the Fiscal Commons Problem for Swiss Cantons
Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Feld, Lars P. - Center for Research in Economics, Management and the … - 2008
The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different fiscal or constitutional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005808591
Saved in:
Cover Image
Do large cabinets favor large governments? : evidence from Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions
Feld, Lars P.; Schaltegger, Christoph A. - 2004
The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261274
Saved in:
Cover Image
Do large cabinets favor large governments?: Evidence from Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions
Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Feld, Lars P. - 2004
The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265723
Saved in:
Cover Image
Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence from Swiss Sub-federal Jurisdictions
Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Feld, Lars P. - 2004
The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be miti-gated by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168185
Saved in:
Cover Image
Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence from Swiss Sub-Federal Jurisdictions
Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Feld, Lars P. - CESifo - 2004
The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094240
Saved in:
Cover Image
Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence from Swiss Sub-federal Jurisdictions
Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Feld, Lars P. - Center for Research in Economics, Management and the … - 2004
The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be miti-gated by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005226983
Saved in:
Cover Image
Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence from Swiss Sub-federal Jurisdictions
Feld, Lars P.; Schaltegger, Christoph A. - Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich … - 2004
The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209058
Saved in:
Cover Image
Do large cabinets favor large governments? : evidence from Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions
Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Feld, Lars P. - 2004
The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011451337
Saved in:
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